Wonder, Aesthetics, and Ethics: A Meditation on Technological Thinking, Psychical Distance, and the Moral Imagination by Gordon, Callen Beck
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2018 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2018 
Wonder, Aesthetics, and Ethics: A Meditation on Technological 
Thinking, Psychical Distance, and the Moral Imagination 
Callen Beck Gordon 
Bard College, cg2455@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Gordon, Callen Beck, "Wonder, Aesthetics, and Ethics: A Meditation on Technological Thinking, Psychical 
Distance, and the Moral Imagination" (2018). Senior Projects Spring 2018. 328. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018/328 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
	
 
 
 
Wonder, Aesthetics, and Ethics: A Meditation on Technological Thinking, 
Psychical Distance, and the Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
Senior Project Submitted to 
The Division of Social Studies 
of Bard College 
 
by 
Callen Gordon 
 
 
 
 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
May 2018 							
	
					
	
Acknowledgments 
 
First and foremost, this project is dedicated to my mom. I could not be more thankful to have 
been graced with your immense determination, imagination, and propensity to feel so deeply. 
You are the brightest and strongest spirit that I know - and it is you that I am eternally grateful to 
for having nurtured my sense of wonder all my life.  
 
To Lee. To all those days spent at sand-mountain, to friendship like I’ve never known before. 
 
To my dad. To the joy of seeing more and more of one another in ourselves as time goes on. 
 
To my soul-sisters: Maddie, Anny, Anne, Loren, and Carina. You are the most special humans I 
know and love. To our past adventures, our future dreams, and our unending and infinite support 
for one another.  
 
To Susan Blake. To embarking on the senior project journey for the very first time, together. To 
the long conversations and the chocolate and the tea and the bravery and openness we both have 
held, side by side, from the start. Thank you for guiding me through this all.  
 
To Bard. To Kritika Yegnashankaran. To Ruth Zisman. The powerful and brilliant women who 
have allowed me to not only believe in my writing capabilities, but also, perhaps most 
importantly, the ideas that are at the heart of my writing. 
 
To the Bard Nursery School. To Carol, Frances, and Allison, and all the children that I have had 
the pleasure of getting to know throughout the past four years. You have filled so many of my 
days with a sheer delight like no other. 
 
To me. To my younger self, my current self, my older self. To falling in and floating out of love - 
to just how beautiful and heart-wrenching it all is. To solitude. To my ability to create small 
heavens both inside and around me. To becoming mine. To loving every wondrous moment of it.  															
	
																																														
	
Table of Contents  
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….. 1 
 
Chapter 1: Technological Thinking and the Modern Lapse in Wonder…………………..…..13 
 Part I: Challenging-Forth and the Standing Reserve……………………………………..…….15 
 Part II: Humanity as Standing-Reserve within Technological Thinking...........19 
 Part III: Technological Thinking and Modern Technology…………………………………31 
            Part IV: The Essence of Humanity and Poiesis as the Saving Power………………….36 
 
Chapter 2: Poiesis and the Aesthetic Approach to the Wonders of Everyday Life……….42 
 Part I: Poiesis as the Revival of an Aesthetic, Appreciative Wonder…………………..43 
 Part II: Poietic Practice, Aura, and the Sentimentality of Everyday Life…………46 
            Part III: Psychical Distance and Aesthetic Disinterestedness………………………..…..50 
 
Chapter 3: Wonder and the Moral Imagination…………………………………………………………………60 
 Part I: The Imagination and the Moral……………………………………………………………………62 
 Part II: The Moral, the Aesthetic, and the Everyday…………………………………………….66 
 Part III: Disinterestedness and the Moral Imagination……………………………………….69 
 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………85 
 
Works Cited ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..96 
 																
	
	 1	
~ Introduction ~ 
In reflection on why this project came to be, I find that it is situated amidst my 
nostalgia for the past - for what once was - and the equally uncomfortable yet exciting 
point of being that I now feel myself moving closer to. Throughout my life, I have 
learned many lessons. But the past four years specifically, spent in the landscape of 
upstate New York, have brought about a peculiar and intense sort of growth and 
enlightenment that I believe I have tried to better understand throughout this project as 
a whole. I am growing. I am, at last, what the world considers to be an “adult”. I plan my 
days, I make my meals, I decide my bedtime, I determine both the smallest and largest 
of decisions within my everyday life. With this, I have increasingly been faced with an 
immense knowing of myself - and I have learned how the ways in which this precise 
realization of myself is ever-changing as time so quickly passes. And that is confusing 
for me.  
 
 It has been hard for me to grow up. As cliche as it sounds, I simultaneously love 
and fear how genuinely and wholeheartedly I want to be a child, forever. 
 
And this is confusing for me. One of the most notable lessons I have learned is 
how illusory the idea of adulthood is. It took me reaching the very point to realize that it 
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might just be the most bizarre and consequential sham of all. The sureness and 
direction and overall control that I once thought came along with reaching this certain 
age somehow, exist and do not exist all at once. I find it difficult to discern between the 
ways in which I surely do feel “adult” - that is, in control of the way in which I navigate 
through my daily life, in touch with the direction I see myself moving in, understanding 
of the more fundamental, or perhaps, practical, aspects of the world around me - and the 
ways in which I so often feel that it is all an utter illusion, one that I too buy into simply 
because of the solace that it provides. Though age truly may be nothing but a number, 
the passing of time that is responsible for the progression of age seems to be moving 
faster and faster as of lately - and with this, it is becoming all the more palpable to me. 
Much of my childhood was spent with the fairies. I spent years of my life writing 
letters to them, building miniature houses for them, looking for signs of their presence 
on the playground or in my room. And they wrote back to me, day after day after day. 
They left iridescent “dragon tears” near my favorite swing, fairy dust all throughout the 
houses I so carefully crafted, and only crumbs on the plates that I, just the night before, 
had left their fairy treats on. My (what then felt like, eternal) dedication to the fairies is 
my first real memory of wonder. Though now, it is clear to me that it is so much more 
than just a memory - it was a sustained experience of wonder; one that I excitedly and 
	 3	
gratefully navigated myself through for years. I relished in getting to know the fairies 
and was eager to share my whole, true, self with them. They let me into their world (one 
that was so different from the one that I had come to know) and I let them into mine. I 
wrote to them about troubles with friends at school, my excitement to have a baby 
sister, my deep-seated confusion about the whereabouts of and my relation to my father. 
I look back on this time and feel nostalgic for the profound sense of magic and beauty 
that came along with it. There was a refreshing sense of mystery - of not knowing the 
world in its entirety, of being open to and appreciative of the other realities (ones that 
were not my own, ones that I could not always so easily perceive) that existed in my 
everyday life back then.  
I suppose what I am trying to make clear here is how close I keep this wonder to 
my heart. I know with certainty that it has not left me - I feel it in the way I carry myself, 
in the way I look at the world, and in my relationships to the people and things around 
me. But the pushes and pulls of the “real” world, of “adulthood”, of obligations and 
productivity and goals, have led me to fear that the world, at some point, may rob me of 
this feeling. Could it be that a gap may form between the ways in which I now must 
think and plan and advance and provide as an older, aging being and the more magical, 
free, and open - much younger - self that I once was? Will this wonder soon become a 
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distant childhood memory? Luckily, having finished this project, I now realize that 
these external pressures that I have been so fearful of - pressures that, of course, have 
compelled me to change internally - have only inspired me to hold onto this wonder with 
an even tighter grasp. Perhaps what I have written is a testament to both the fears I 
have of becoming disenchanted by the world (of becoming out of touch with magic and 
mystery, of losing my sense of wonder) and the sureness I feel of not only its importance, 
but also, my ability to keep it alive and with me at all times. Perhaps the journey that 
these ideas have led me on act as the mental, emotional, logical, physical bridge 
between the past and the future that I needed to traverse to realize what my fear of 
growing up was born of, and why actually, I do not in fact need to be so scared at all. 
This was a way for me to make sense of myself - to make the most of myself. I hope you, 
as the reader, are familiar with this sense of wonder. And perhaps, you too have felt the 
demands of the world attempt to rob you of it. Hopefully what I have written here can 
relieve you of the fears you may feel in the way that it has for me. For my sake, for our 
sake, I hope what I have written here allows you to strive just as much as I do to keep 
your wonder alive, allowing it to flourish throughout and color your everyday life with 
the profound delight that both you and the world so rightfully deserve.  
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Though this project may be about wonder, it is necessary for me to make clear, in 
its beginning, that I by no means feel that I can or should provide a definition of it. For 
if I tried, which I dare not, I believe I’d be doing it an injustice. Instead, what I have 
intended to provide an account of is what comes before wonder, what comes after it - 
what the consequences of its loss and the great value of its presence are. It seems to me 
that it is exactly wonder’s ineffable, ephemeral nature that makes it as special and 
curious of a part of our conscious experience as it is. While we may be able to relate to 
one another’s sense and experience of wonder through some of the more evident 
experiences of it - the dazzling display of a meteor shower, the nearly intoxicating 
sound of the instrumental climax within a piece of music, or perhaps, the mesmeric 
sensation that comes along with looking deeply into a lover’s irises - when it comes 
down to it, wonder comes in an infinite array of forms, making it sublimely impossible 
to know in its entirety. It is exactly this great variation in its manifestation that stands 
to be a fundamental part of my project. In my account of how we can (and why we 
should) reinvigorate our sense of wonder, I make clear that this is not so much about the 
content of our experience (for example, one’s stumbling upon something super 
spectacular and therefore, feeling wonder). Instead, wonder as I have come to 
understand it is wholly reliant upon the attitude that we have towards the things (both 
	 6	
the spectacular and the mundane alike) that we come across in our everyday lives. I feel 
strongly that even the most commonplace of objects and experiences can elicit some 
sense of wonder - it is just a matter of us being receptive enough, in our everyday lives, 
to their potential to do so. 
 For a moment, reflect back upon some moment of wonder that you have had in 
your lifetime. It could be recent, distant, brought about by something undoubtedly 
striking, or perhaps, surprisingly, it came of something quite small or ordinary. 
Hopefully you can agree with me that such moments make us feel really good; they allow 
for a momentary shift in one’s usual perspective, they make you feel big and small all at 
once, and most importantly, they seem to provide a temporary escape and relief from 
ourselves - a recess from the self that we did not even know we needed or wanted.  
I feel that in today’s world especially, these moments are of utmost importance, and it is 
my intention to figure out how to make both our sense and experience of wonder more 
recurrent in our everyday lives. With this, I begin with an account of our loss of wonder, 
then move onto the poietic, aesthetic means by which we can revive it, and lastly, make 
clear the moral value that I feel we can attribute to such wonder. 
I must admit that the writing in my first chapter begins on a rather bleak note. 
Perhaps that only makes sense though, as my reasoning for this investigation of wonder 
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was born of the fears that I have of losing it as I grow older. With that, my writing 
commences in account of Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, a text 
that, once I read for the first time, immediately spoke to the faults within our society 
that I believe exist. His notion of Enframement, and humanity’s technological thinking 
in particular, reflect the ways in which modern-day society inflicts upon us a sort of 
utilitarian perception and use of the world around us. This tendency to view facets of 
the world as mere means to our own ends, what Heidegger calls “challenging-forth”, is 
something that I feel I have become increasingly exposed to as I grow older - it is here 
that my concerns about my (and our) sense of wonder lie. Heidegger makes clear that 
within this particular state of mind - within this drive to rule over the world, to leave 
our mark on all that we come in contact with - a questioning of why it is that we are this 
way, why it is that we think and feel and do the things we do, becomes of great 
importance. Similar to Heidegger, I sense the danger that comes along with a mindless 
acceptance of our technological thinking - for what is left unquestioned is then 
effortlessly perpetuated. By the end of this chapter, I will have hopefully made clear how 
reflective the relationship we have to the world around is of the relationship that we 
have to ourselves. In our going about the world with such a fervent sense of control, 
calculability, productivity, and disposability, we arrive at a strangely subtle yet pervasive 
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internalized sense of alienation and disenchantment - what I argue reflects some loss of 
our sense of wonder.  
But despite this, I (as was Heidegger) am hopeful. In coming to better know how 
exactly it is that we go about our place in this world, how it is that we choose to make 
our mark, or perhaps, on the contrary, recognize and savor what is left unmarked by us, 
we then can decide for ourselves what sort of correspondence to the world is most right. 
With this, Heidegger’s proposed solution to the problem of our technological thinking 
becomes of great importance to my writing as a whole. Poiesis - a recognition and 
appreciation of the world that is inspired by a “letting-be” of what is - stands to 
challenge the very ways in which we so often come to see, understand, and go about the 
world through ourselves; through how we can benefit from or take control over a given 
object, process, or experience. It is within my second chapter that I provide an evolved 
conception of poiesis as a sort of psychological practice in which one takes an aesthetic 
perspective on the world. Much of my writing in this chapter aims to dissect the often 
mechanical and easily overlooked manner in which we carry through our everyday lives.  
How is it that we exercise our will upon the world in even just the ways that we see it 
and think of it? What do the things that we recognize, change, assert our power over, or 
perhaps, not recognize at all, say about who we are as people? I argue that poiesis, a 
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particularly non-exploitative, objective, and selfless perception and appreciation of the 
world, in which one opens themselves up to both the most ordinary and remarkable of 
wonders that exist within the fine lines of everyday life is the way in which our sense of 
wonder can be reinvigorated. To get to the root of the deep ties that exist between our 
perception of the world and who we are as people, I introduce the aesthetic concepts of 
psychical distance and disinterestedness, formulated many years ago by Edward Bullough 
and Jerome Stolnitz. I ultimately posit that my conception of poiesis is a near perfect 
reflection of what it looks like to facilitate these two aesthetic practices, in which the 
potent awareness that we have of ourselves within a given experience, and in turn, our 
tendency to encounter that experience through our own subjectivities (e.g., particular 
opinions, desires, fears, etc.) is handed entirely over to a complete and objective 
awareness of the elements of the experience at hand. This momentary detachment from 
the self, where the objective qualities of what lies outside of us - qualities entirely 
independent of the self - are recognized and relished within, inspires in us a shift away 
from our usual self-oriented perspective of the world, ultimately allowing for a 
recognition of the wondrous realities that are far too often left unnoticed otherwise.  
 With both the reasoning behind our loss of wonder and the poietic approach to 
life that can allow for its revival made clear, my final chapter is based upon my notion 
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that such wonder has immense moral implications - it quite literally makes us better 
people. I argue that this more objective, aesthetic perception and appreciation of the 
world, contrary to our technological thinking, lends to a growth in our moral 
imaginations - that is, our ability to creatively conceive of moral standpoints, 
possibilities, explanations, and relations that extend outside of our usual, particular, 
point of view. Using Michael McGhee’s Moral Sentiments, Social Exclusion, Aesthetic 
Education as the foundation of my exploration of the ties between wonder and morality, 
I adopt two dimensions of his argument that stand to be crucial to my own: 1) that a 
universalization of our moral sentiments (what I argue, is the heart of the moral 
imagination) involves a balance between reason, emotion, and our sensuous experience 
and 2) that identification of the sources of morality within everyday experience is of 
great importance. I begin in reflection of the importance of our aesthetic perception - in 
particular, its potential to direct our attention away from the self. Beyond this shift in 
our attention and the experience of wonder that comes along with it, what I hope to get 
at is the impact that such a process can have on our sense of morality as a whole. 
Ultimately, I argue that it is this poietic perception of and relation to the world - the 
disinterested shift away from subjectivity - that necessarily then informs and inspires an 
opening up of our moral perception of the world as well. Despite our hesitation to use 
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the attitudes, attention, and relations that we use to navigate through our daily lives as a 
genuine, accurate, reflection of who we are as people, perhaps what is truly at the heart 
of this final chapter is my strong feeling that there is in fact a strong tie between how 
we are in our everyday lives (what catches our eye, what we appreciate, what we allow to 
amaze us for a moment or two, what we reflect upon) and what we then deem worthy of 
contemplation, recognition, and/or acceptance within a morally relevant situation. 
Seeing as emotion often leads our moral compass to stay closely tied to our own 
subjectivities - what McGhee calls “the bias to the near”, I argue that it is the conscious, 
reasoned, disinterested shift away from oneself that then allows for the moral sentiment’s 
move from the particular (that is, a subjective self-orientation) to the universal (an 
objective, selfless orientation and understanding). 
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~ Chapter 1 ~ 
Technological Thinking and the Modern Lapse in Wonder 
 Although my exploration of our sense of wonder in everyday life is very much 
rooted in the contemporary world, my aim in this first chapter is to locate exactly how 
and why we have lost sight of this wonder. In doing so, it is necessary to go back in time 
to some degree, which will subsequently allow for a rigorous reexamination of many of 
our present-day conceptions. These conceptions, regarding nature, production, control, 
efficiency, technology, and of course - most importantly - what it means to be human, 
all make up the heart of an essay written just over sixty years ago by Martin Heidegger, 
The Question Concerning Technology. Heidegger’s essay is inspired by a discomfort he 
holds regarding humanity’s understanding and use of technology - what I will refer to 
quite generally as our “technological thinking”. For it this particularly pervasive 
mentality - one that shapes the relationship we have with the world around us - that I 
ultimately argue reflects our losing sight of our sense of wonder in everyday life. 
Considering the time that has passed since this essay was written, the situation that 
Heidegger begins by pointing to has undoubtedly only increased in relevance. 
Applicable now more than ever, Heidegger began by stating that “Everywhere we 
remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But 
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we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something 
neutral...this [neutrality] makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology” (QCT, 4). 
With this, the importance - and now, what I call for as necessity - of reexamining our 
increasingly close tie to technology (and most importantly, the thinking that underlies it) 
is made clear. Though much of this chapter is spent unpacking Heidegger’s notions of 
humanity’s “challenging-forth”, the “standing-reserve”, and our technological thinking, 
my ultimate intention is to arrive at a contemporary re-articulation of these terms that 
portrays the misunderstood and uncontrolled dynamic between us and the world around 
us. Heidegger begins his essay by putting forth his method of questioning; “in what 
follows, we shall be questioning...questioning builds a way. The way is a way of thinking. 
We shall be questioning concerning technology…” (QCT, 3). Both Heidegger and myself 
are carrying out very similar tasks, it seems, both fueled by an intense questioning of a 
given issue (his, technology; mine, wonder). Interestingly enough, the path of 
questioning that Heidegger goes down - and the conclusions that he eventually arrives 
at - stand as the foundation, or starting point, for the path of questioning that I then 
embark on. In his questioning of the essence of technology (or technological thinking) 
and the relationship that humanity has with it, Heidegger reaches his conviction of 
humanity’s state of Enframement. It is this very state of Enframement - this state in 
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which technological thinking comes to dominate human consciousness and 
subsequently shape our relation to the world outside of us - that I then argue reflects 
some deprivation of our experience of wonder in daily life. 
 
Part I: Challenging-Forth and the Standing Reserve  
 Seeing as the core of my argument about our absence of wonder rests on 
Heidegger’s notion of technological thinking, I will begin by unpacking a few terms 
that are central to an understanding of it. The challenging-forth that Heidegger speaks 
of can be understood as a sort of mentality or method of revealing that has become 
increasingly prevalent in the contemporary world. “The revealing that rules throughout 
modern technology [and, for the sake of my argument, contemporary society] has the 
character of setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That challenging happens 
in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, 
what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is 
distributed is switched about ever anew” (Heidegger, QCT, 16). Here, Heidegger is 
depicting the ultra-directed, utilitarian mentality that influences our regard for and use 
of the natural world - that is, how exactly we reveal facets of the world around is 
reflective of how we think of it. In simpler terms, one might say that such a challenging-
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forth is the ultimate portrayal of the way in which we often times only perceive, 
understand, and ultimately use the the world an extension of ourselves - with this, much 
of world around us comes to be considered as a mere means to a specific end. With our 
viewing of the world in such a way comes a sense of interchangeability and disposability 
- we overlook the uniqueness and true essence of things in exchange for a more 
straightforward, human-centered, directly beneficial understanding and use of them. 
With this in mind, one must question where such a regard for the world came from - 
here, I will build upon David Waddington’s idea that the root of this challenging-forth 
lies in humanity’s great desire for efficiency (A Field Guide to Understanding Heidegger, 
569). While this penchant, even need, for efficiency is not intrinsically good nor bad 
(perhaps it is safe to say that it is really only natural), we must further dissect what such 
a mindset is made up of. Efficiency might be characterized by a sort of maximum 
effectiveness with a minimum effort and/or expense - it requires a sense of calculability, 
controllability, rigorous productivity, and therefore, some degree of disposability. 
Inherent in such a process is a reduction - a narrowing in on what exactly is needed 
and/or wanted out of a given thing, and the way in which we can most efficiently attain it.  
It may come as no surprise that such a mentality, rooted deeply in rigorous, 
widespread efficiency does not naturally coincide with experiences of wonder. Such 
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efficiency lends to a “challenging” or demanding of the most controllable, beneficial use 
of a given thing - it quite literally reduces the potentials of the natural world to only the 
ones which we can have the most control over and benefit from. In Michael 
Zimmerman’s Beyond Humanism: Heidegger’s Understanding of Technology, he quite 
beautifully states that, “To be capable of transforming a forest into packaging for 
cheeseburgers, man must see the forest not as a display of the miracle of life, but as raw 
material, pure and simple” (79). The forest is no longer understood, viewed, and 
appreciated as a place of incredible, natural growth and life - we choose destruction, 
productivity, and efficiency over admiration and discovery. In looking at the world 
around us through the sorely black-and-white lens of efficiency, we have begun to 
neglect all aspects of the natural world that reside outside of our immediate control - 
 potentials of the natural world that may not be so obviously or materialistically 
beneficial to us, features of the natural world that I argue are actually the most 
extraordinary, the most wondrous. With this, we have reduced the world around us into 
merely controllable objects of use - simple resources - that of which Heidegger names 
the “standing-reserve”.  
 While our “challenging-forth” is best understood as a mindset that inspires the 
particular way in which we use the world around us, the “standing-reserve” can be seen 
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as the product of such a process. Heidegger states, “When [humanity] investigating, 
observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving…” (QCT,17), “everywhere, 
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for further ordering” (QCT, 19). This notion of the “standing-
reserve” sheds light on the way in which we view the natural world as mere stuff, further 
understand this stuff as inventory, use this inventory as a specific means to a specific 
ends, all of it enduringly on standby to be used in whatever way we wish. Referencing 
back to Michael Zimmerman’s example, a forest is turned into “standing-reserve” as 
soon as our conception (and therefore, use) of it is reduced to something as inglorious 
and synthetic as “packaging for cheeseburgers”. When something (like a forest) gains 
the status of “standing-reserve”, it marks the loss of our ability to perceive its intrinsic 
nature and identity - our ability to come to it, and feel wonder. The incredibility of its 
existence is overlooked, its beauty is overlooked, its purpose beyond just human use is 
overlooked - and in turn, only its most efficient, obvious, calculable, controllable use is 
recognized and utilized. While some may argue that humanity’s esteem for the world in 
which they inhabit is not revealed through their use of it, I beg to differ. It seems only 
right that our use of the world around us - the way in which we understand it and go 
about it on a daily basis - is perhaps the truest reflection of the way we feel about it - for 
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both our use and understanding of a given thing (including ourselves) is to me, two 
mirrors, reflecting right back at one another. With such an understanding and use of the 
world in place (our challenging-forth into the standing reserve), we have risked being 
unable to regard and utilize it all in any other way than just this one. Here, we forfeit 
our sense of wonder.  
 
Part II: Humanity as Standing-Reserve within Technological Thinking 
At this point, the two central elements of technological thinking (our 
challenging-forth and the standing-reserve) have been made clear. Therefore, we now 
must delve into why exactly we have come to think and act in such ways. Heidegger’s 
answer to this question points to our state of Enframement - what he believes to be a 
phenomenon of sorts - one that has happened “neither exclusively in man, nor 
decisively through man” (QCT, 18). It is not our own doing, per se, but instead, a 
condition that we are trapped within and ordered by. In his speaking to how exactly this 
state of Enframement came to be, Heidegger’s answers are not actually all that different 
than my own. Considering Heidegger began his questioning of technology in 1954, he 
points to physics (but most importantly, the type of thinking that lies as the foundation 
for it) as the predecessor of our technological thinking. “[Humanity’s] ordering attitude 
	 20	
and behavior display themselves first in the rise of modern physics as an exact science. 
Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable 
coherence of forces” (QCT, 21). Heidegger argues that it is the manageability, 
calculability, and utility at the heart of scientific thinking that “is the herald of 
Enframing…” (QCT, 22) - it is this very specific way of thinking (a way that has 
increasing importance in contemporary society) that inspires us to view and treat the 
world in the ways that we do. While he surely recognizes the consequences of this 
scientific rationality taking hold within us, I feel that in my current analysis of our 
technological thinking, more than just the “modern physics” that Heidegger points to 
must be considered. 
This is especially true in meditation on Heidegger’s statement that “Only to the 
extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can 
this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not 
man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?” 
(QCT, 18). While, again, I very much agree with Heidegger that scientific rationality 
plays a large part in our technological thinking, for humanity to be at the heart of the 
standing-reserve, compelled by technological thinking to carry out in their relation to 
the world in such ways, I argue that there must be more to it. With this, I now seek to fill 
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in these gaps, beginning with my own argument on the origins of technological 
thinking and later arriving at how humans function as a central part of the standing-
reserve. In my attempt to answer where technological thinking (or perhaps more 
specifically, the true root of it all - our sense of challenging-forth) comes from (and 
subsequently, what our loss of wonder was born of), I argue that it is helpful to consider 
it as an emergent phenomenon of sorts. Beyond Heidegger’s proposal of modern physics 
(or the scientific rationality that underlies it) as the single cause of technological 
thinking, I call for a consideration of a few other systems - all in reaction with one 
another - that have come to produce the dominance that technological thinking has 
over us. These increasingly complex systems include capitalism, religion, large-scale 
industry, technology, and of course, scientific rationality; it is these systems, in 
operation with one another, inspiring one another, growing alongside one another, that 
I argue, are responsible for the mentality that makes up our technological thinking. 
Though I think that such widely disputed systems are often times too quickly thrown 
around as both the problems and the solutions of contemporary society, I believe that 
perhaps it is this way because (as Heidegger argues about technology), we do not really 
examine the deeply contagious thinking that is at the heart of them.   
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“God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply it, and fill the earth and subdue it; and 
have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves 
upon the Earth.” 
 - Genesis 1:28 
 
With this in mind, I feel that it is best to step away from Heidegger for just a 
moment, and instead, consider two intellectuals, Karl Marx and Max Weber, who both 
came to similar  (and conveniently, well-known) conclusions about the state of humanity 
that undoubtedly point to 1) humanity not only perpetuating the issue at hand, but also 
(unconsciously) placing themselves at the core of it (e.g., humans not only making 
everything around them into standing-reserve, but also turning themselves into 
standing-reserve) and 2) what I interpret as, the subsequent loss of wonder that comes 
along with this. Beginning with Marx’s theory of alienation, in his Estranged Labor 
(written in 1844), he too began with a questioning… “For what is life except activity?” (6). 
To be human is to pursue action of some kind on a daily basis, and similar to Heidegger, 
Marx esteemed the human capacity for creative productivity. But quite similar to the 
sort of dissociation that comes of challenging-forth the world into standing-reserve, 
alienation from our work, our products, and most importantly, ourselves and each other, 
lends to far less meaning found in our day to day life. Everything, including ourselves, is 
reduced to a mere “practical” thing - a thing used to get yet another thing done. 
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Much of Marx’s writing was rooted in his feeling that the social structures that 
were beginning to pervade the workforce during his time lended to the work itself 
alienating humans from their very own human identity - an identity that is very much 
about one’s work and production (or as Heidegger would put it, revealing) amounting to 
meaningful activity, and in turn, a meaningful life. In his examination of alienation, he 
made clear how both the divisions of labor and private ownership led to a tragic 
divergence between the workers, their products, and the meaning they found in their 
working activity. Spending such time doing work that we are so vastly and personally 
estranged from, Marx argued we begin to cling desperately to this work - this work that 
we have been told (and subsequently, lead ourselves to believe) proves our worth and 
dedication - this work that allows us to look out into the world and see only the 
products of our very own creation. But little do we seem to know that “the more the 
workers appropriate the exterior world of sensuous nature by [their] labour, the more 
[they] doubly deprive [themselves] of [not only] the means of subsistence” but also, [their] 
human essence (Marx, 5;7). Here, Marx seems to have possibly rooted an idea that 
inspired Heidegger’s inquiry years and years later - that is, that the social structures of a 
given time inspire all aspects of the work and general activity we carry out. And most 
importantly, the fact that much of this work and activity functions to seize the world as 
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our very own, straying us far away from ever being able to recognize and appreciate the 
true essence of the world around us - that is, both the small and large wonders, beyond 
ourselves, that exist, often overlooked, in our everyday lives. Both Marx and Heidegger 
make clear that the very work and activity that we carry out, day in and day out, is 
actually not inherently wrong. Instead, it is the external social structures - and more 
specifically, the dominant, internalized mentalities that come of these structures - that 
end up shaping the way in which we go about the world that stands to be the problem. 
Max Weber’s theory of disenchantment, a theory that he spent time writing about 
right after Marx (between the late 1800’s and early 1900’s), seems to point to the very 
same problem within modernity that both Marx and Heidegger (and now, myself) feel 
troubled by. In Richard Jenkins’ Disenchantment, Enchantment, and Re-Enchantment: Max 
Weber at the Millennium, he defines Weberian disenchantment as “the historical process 
by which the natural world and all areas of human experience become experienced and 
understood as less mysterious; defined, at least in principle, as knowable, predictable, 
and manipulable by humans; conquered by and incorporated into the interpretive 
schema of science and rational government. In a disenchanted world everything 
becomes understandable and tameable...Increasingly the world becomes more human-
centred and the universe more impersonal” (12). Weber’s theory points to the ways in 
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which we have cast aside all mystery, magic, meaning, and of course, wonder, for what 
we believe is a complete, holistic, knowledge of the world and how it works - one that 
we are in control of. This, he named, rationalization. Since Weber, many years ago, 
proposed this theory of disenchantment, I argue that this sense of rationalization has 
only increased. A near perfect paradigm of rationalization in the contemporary society 
would be fast-food restaurants, built upon utmost efficiency and profit (assembly line-
esque production, replacement of humans with machines that can do certain jobs more 
quickly and consistently, uniforms, drive-through window option to maximize speed 
and profit). Other examples might be the ways in which we shift and/or replace given 
traditions or values in a society unlike our own with more “rational” or “productive” 
methods in the name of benefitting and/or helping them, our very own use of steroids, 
plastic surgery, and study drugs, the importance we place upon standardized tests, high 
scores, and textbook knowledge, and our prolonged use of fossil fuels. Our jobs, our 
education, our outreach, our everyday activity, our bodies, our minds - everything is 
permeated by rationalization. And in taking a closer look at it, it becomes clear that at 
the heart of it all is a morbid and narcissistic tie to ourselves. This deep-seated penchant 
we have for finding ways in which we become more in control and we become “better” 
leads us to a point in which the world is nothing but a mirror of our own subjectivities. I 
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argue that it is this, this omnipresent rationalization and disenchantment, that allows 
no space nor time for this certain sense and experience of wonder in our everyday lives. 
Although capitalist modes of production, various forms of rationalization, and 
technological thinking are all obviously responsible for various kinds of social, 
scientific, intellectual, political, and economic advances, what Marx, Weber, Heidegger, 
and now myself, all have pointed out are the (much more difficult to recognize) ways in 
which these things have actually trapped us within ourselves. Marx points to the 
alienation that comes of capitalist modes of production, Weber sheds light on the 
disenchantment that is born of widespread rationalization, and Heidegger portrays the 
technological thinking that ultimately comes of challenging-forth. Though I agree 
wholeheartedly with the conclusions that these great thinkers came to, I wish to go 
beyond these supposed states that we are trapped within, for pointing them out does not 
have seemed to cease our perpetuation of them. With this, I question what these states 
(alienation, disenchantment, and Enframement) have robbed us of, and to this I answer… 
wonder.  
In further deconstruction of Heidegger’s argument (though it can also be applied 
to Marx’s alienation and Weber’s disenchantment), David Waddington claims that such 
a wide-spread, somewhat “naturally-occurring” mentality like technological thinking 
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can be considered a part of what he calls the dominant consciousness of society. 
“Simply by virtue of being in society, human beings are always already lost in this 
[dominant consciousness]...no one is to blame; it is simply an inevitable element of the 
structure of human existence” (576). This pre-conceived state that we are born into at 
this point, marked by a sense of knowing, predicting, manipulating, and using, has 
turned into a mainstream ideology of sorts, one that provides direction, comfort, and 
control over how and why we spend our time in the ways that we do. Inspired by Tina 
Chanter’s writing on Marx’s alienation, I argue that technological thinking is not only a 
dominant consciousness, but a false dominant consciousness (that is, a way of thinking 
that justifies a certain way of acting/being, but in turn, prevents one from being in touch 
with how and why they truly are this way). I borrow this sociological term in hopes of 
better explaining how exactly we as humans not only perpetuate going about the world 
as standing-reserve, but alas, treats ourselves as such. Considering the prevalence of false 
consciousnesses (such as technological thinking), it may come as a surprise that they are 
so often overlooked; but it is actually for this reason exactly - their pervasiveness - that 
they are so difficult to recognize, and ultimately, see past. For it is nearly impossible to 
question something that has come to be all that we really know. In the Encyclopedia of 
Social Psychology, a false consciousness is defined as an ideology that inadvertently 
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“functions to both obscure and justify oppression and dominance...through institutional 
control over religion, education, culture, the media, and political and economic 
institutions…” (Baumeister, 342). The importance of the term “false” is made clear in 
Baumeister’s statement that such a consciousness “reflects biased interests [of a higher 
power] rather than one’s own interests” (ESP, 342). Throughout Chanter’s The 
Problematic Normative Assumptions of Heidegger’s Ontology, she spends some time 
exploring the relation between capitalism and false consciousness - a comparison that I 
find useful in my examination of humanity’s standing at the heart of their very own 
technological thinking. She states, “The genius of capitalism rests in its ability to elicit 
the support of the worker, so that the worker participates in ensuring the continuation 
of his or her own oppression, by reproducing the conditions of oppression that reduce 
him to a mere thing. The worker’s false consciousness facilitates his or her own 
collusion with the aims of capitalism” (84). Here, Chanter points to the “genius” of 
states, systems, and ways of thinking such as capitalism and technological thinking; it is 
the false consciousness that is the foundation of them - a consciousness that we begin 
to adopt as our very own - that puts us at the forefront of the perpetuation of these 
systems. With this, hopefully I have made clear how little separation there is between us 
and these economic, political, social, and psychological states and systems - it is almost 
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as if we have become hijacked by the principles and goals of the systems themselves, 
subsequently designating us as the conductors of their continuation. 
While at this point I believe I have made the ways in which we preserve our 
technological thinking clear (by means of challenging-forth the external world into 
standing-reserve), what I now feel is most important is the way in which we challenge-
forth ourselves into standing-reserve - for it is this that would truly put us at the heart of 
our technological thinking. In reference to the way in which false consciousnesses 
function, Chanter makes clear how it is higher systems and/or powers with biased 
interests (e.g., rationalization, capitalism, technological thinking, etc.) that  “determines 
the worker’s thought patterns, behaviors, gestures, self-image, and so on. The false 
consciousness of capitalist ideology infects the worker, [and] the worker succumbs to 
false consciousness because he or she is captivated by the system that he or she, as a 
functioning member of the working class, continues to reproduce” (85). Let us now 
think about this in terms of our technological thinking; it is exactly these thoughts, 
behaviors, impressions of ourselves, of others, and of the (natural) world that are shaped 
by our challenging-forth. Similarly to Chanter, Heidegger also sheds light on the way in 
which we seem to be “captivated by” (and therefore, responsible for the preservation of) 
technological thinking. “Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts 
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himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail 
that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion 
gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always 
encounters only himself. In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any 
longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence” (QCT, Heidegger, 27). It is this invigorating 
illusion of dominance that we are overcome by, that just as Chanter pointed out, not 
only perpetuates, but also (I would argue) strengthens the false consciousness of 
technological thinking. For it leads to our mistaken belief that in claiming more of the 
world as our own, by producing more of this and that, by looking this way and buying 
these things, or ultimately, by creating things (intelligences, perhaps) that far surpass 
our own abilities, maybe, - just maybe - we can get back what we have lost. Just as I 
argued previously in my mention of Weberian disenchantment, we endlessly attempt to 
fill this misunderstood hole in our hearts with a sort of God-complex that we hold onto 
for dear life. But it is within this illusion of power, control, and knowing that we end up 
losing ourselves even more. It is our own disenchantment with ourselves that is the 
pivotal aftermath of our unrecognized, unexamined false consciousness that then 
inspires the way in which we live our everyday lives. 
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“This future man, whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to 
be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere 
(secularly speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself… The 
question is only whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical knowledge in this direction, and 
this question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a political question of the first order and 
therefore can hardly be left to the decision of professional scientists or professional politicians.” 
  
-Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
Part III: Technological Thinking and Modern Technology 
 With a thorough understanding of challenging-forth, the standing reserve, and 
technological thinking in place, it hopefully is clear that actually nothing about 
Heidegger’s argument is intrinsically tied to technology. While this is of great 
importance for my own argument - seeing as I insist that our technological thinking has 
imbued aspects of our lives far beyond technology (and ultimately is to blame for our 
loss of wonder) - it is necessary to now look closely at the importance behind 
Heidegger’s connection of these concepts to modern technology. In reference back to 
my earlier argument that challenging-forth is rooted in our hunger for efficiency, I now 
maintain that while this desire for efficiency has most certainly always existed (we 
wouldn’t be here today without it), it is the rise of modern technology that has allowed 
us to attain an incredibly, perhaps unexpectedly, high degree of efficiency - one that has 
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allowed us to feel in utter-control of it all - one that has led to a lapse in appreciation for 
the world as it is without our mark being made on it. 
 Although the dominance of our technological thinking came to be far before 
modern technology, I believe that Heidegger asserts the strong connection between 
them as so significant because they allow one another to flourish in ways that they 
otherwise could not. Before I delve into the strong ties between technological thinking 
and modern technology, I feel it is important to re-establish my view that neither 
technological thinking nor modern technology are necessarily all bad or inherently 
harmful - for the world that we now live in demands such efficiency in many ways...but 
seeing as the heart of Heidegger’s argument calls for a re-thinking of why and how we 
think and act in such ways - and what our relationship to the objects of this cruel 
affection is built upon - the necessity of our questioning remains strong. As stated by 
Tim Rayner in his writing Heidegger in Silicon Valley, Heidegger “simply indicates that 
we need to be mindful of the way that we engage with the world, assuming that we want 
to avoid treating people, living beings, and other natural phenomena as mere resources. 
This is precisely what [he] finds objectionable about Enframing: it diminishes the 
ontological standing of things”. Here, Rayner makes clear how (as I have previously 
stated) our utilitarian understanding and use of a given thing functions to rob us of our 
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potential to perceive, use, and appreciate its essence and potential beyond just human 
use and benefit. 
I will begin at the very start of the ever-growing relationship between modern 
technology and technological thinking; this stands to be the way in which modern 
technology has turned the natural world into a mere means to an end. In Heidegger’s 
essay, he points to modern technology such as hydroelectric power plants - a sort of 
technology transferred onto nature (similar to fracking or even our production of 
weapons of mass destruction). Such technology clearly demonstrates not only our 
eagerness for - but also the illusion that we have attained - a sort of mastery over the 
natural world. Beyond just this, Heidegger notes how the hydroelectric power plant 
ultimately robs the river of its true essence; with such a technology in place, “even the 
Rhine (river) itself appears as something at our command. The river is dammed up into 
the power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out 
of the essence of the power station” (Heidegger, 16). Instead of being a location of 
leisure, a place to explore and admire, a method of travel, a means of migration for fish, 
a place where amphibians, insects, and crustaceans eat, live, and reproduce (note: none 
of these “uses” attempt to regulate or control the river in any way, and subsequently, 
they all may be liable to facilitate a sense of wonder), in time, the Rhine becomes 
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nothing other than a power source for us. Though it may seem like quite a bold 
statement for Heidegger to make, I believe its truth is made clear in modern 
technology’s move beyond just nature - a move that marks how modern technology 
turns into a means to an end in and of itself. 
Let us now look at how our more recent technological advancements have acted 
to perpetuate our technological thinking - how technology itself (not only what it is used 
upon) is now intended to be a means to an end. One of the most prevalent technologies 
of this day and age very well may be the iPhone. Sure...it is a phone - we need phones to 
communicate! We use phones to take pictures, to store thoughts and grocery lists, to 
map us from point A to point B, to read our daily horoscopes. While this all may seem 
wondrous to some degree, what is at the heart of these actions is due for further 
examination. The majority of the time spent on our phones is in use of various apps - 
these include Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, Tinder, etc. According to Tristan Harris, 
a former Google Design Ethicist, each and every single one of these apps is a part of the 
“arms race for attention”. What he means by this is that their true function is in their 
competition with one another to see which one can get the most “screen time” - in other 
words, their goal is to make sure the iPhone user spends as much time as possible on 
their app to generate money. Here we see how not only the most common form of 
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modern technology in this day and age - but also, most importantly, its users 
(humanity!!!) - are a disguised means to the unfortunately unsurprising end-goal of 
money. While there is obvious manipulation of people involved in this process, 
contemplation on future technological “advancements” (transhumanism, for example) 
only points to an escalation in humans (not just technology) becoming the main means 
to an end in our challenging-forth.  
 This evolution from modern technology turning the natural world into a means 
to an end, to modern technology functioning as a means to an end in and of itself, to, 
lastly, modern technology turning humans into a mere means to an end shows a clearly 
intensifying issue at hand. But what I argue to be the most problematic of it all is our 
internalization of this “mere means to an end” mentality - our technological thinking. 
Far beyond the realm of modern technology, I argue that this rigorously efficient, all-
knowing, in control mind-set has permeated aspects of our lives that we are hardly 
aware of, so much so that we have begun to challenge-forth ourselves. The ways in which 
we do this to ourselves can be seen in the ultra-rationalized jobs we work, our drive for 
maximized profit at minimum expense, the stark way in which we control and calculate 
every aspect of our lives (from our bodies to our daily schedules), and the increased 
importance of textbook knowledge and test scores. In thinking - in being - such a way, 
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we act as predictably and productively as society wants us to. We pride ourselves on the 
money we make, what we choose to buy with it, how we look, our unsurpassable 
efficiency, our great knowledge of the world! Amidst such “advances”, we neglect what 
we have left behind. That, I argue, is our very own essence (as I elaborate upon in the 
next section); our penchant for revealing in a very different way - our sense of and drive 
towards pure wonder. 
 
Part IV: The Essence of Humanity & Poiesis as the Saving Power 
 Throughout Heidegger’s essay, he maintains that as humans, our essence is to 
reveal. “Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. All revealing 
comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open…” (Heidegger, 25). 
One must wonder though - what is this revealing of exactly? I would argue that the 
majority of our activity as humans is revealing of either the world, ourselves, each 
other…or all of these things at the very same time. It is through our language, our 
meaning-making, our connecting (ideas, patterns, people), our using, understanding, 
and creating that we reveal the world, ourselves, and each other simultaneously. 
Notably, the degree to which we carry this out (and perhaps most importantly, the 
degree to which we need to carry this out) is totally unique to humanity, and quite 
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obviously has the potential to be harmonious with the world around us. It is at this 
point that Heidegger’s distinction between the two “types” of revealing becomes of 
utmost importance. While one is driven by technological thinking (our challenging-
forth), the other is poiesis.  
  While we have maintained our essence of revealing, Heidegger suggests that the 
kind of revealing that we are carrying out is unsound, irresponsible, and at the very 
worst, completely unconscious. Our unawareness of the way we relate to, use, and reveal 
ourselves and the world around us leads to our blind acceptance of it - and it is our 
blind, unquestioning acceptance that leads to perpetuation, and our perpetuation that 
leads to a norm. Though much of what Heidegger and I are saying sounds quite 
defeatist, towards the end of his essay he does point towards a glimmer of hope - that 
hope, which Heidegger proposes as the root of our resolution, is awareness. “Human 
activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never 
banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a 
higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time, kindred to it” 
(Heidegger, 33). As Heidegger makes clear, if we truly want to separate ourselves from 
our technological thinking, we cannot begin with sheer action - for all  “activity” and 
“achievements” of ours (at this point) are charged by our challenging-forth. As 
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Heidegger states, “Only what is granted endures…” (QCT, Heidegger, 31); in our 
obliviousness to our technological thinking, we permit and perpetuate it. Therefore, we 
must reflect and ponder - we must question, recognize, and confront our Enframement - 
how it drives us, inspires us, how it colors our world completely. It is only through this 
process - through our awareness - that we can gain any distance from this mentality - 
this false consciousness - that has seemingly become second nature to us. Once 
distanced, I argue that we will have the chance to re-examine and reorient our 
relationship to both the world and ourselves. We will have the chance to ask ourselves 
how, as revealers, we want to conceive of and enact our place in this world. Our regard 
for and use of nature, technology, education, work - all the ways in which we choose to 
spend our time, day in and day out - will have the chance to be charged with wonder in a 
way that we left behind long ago.  
 
“Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. Above all, Enframing 
conceals that revealing which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. 
Thus the challenging, Enframing, conceals a former way of revealing.” 
-(QCT, Heidegger, 27) 
  
In conclusion of my investigation of humanity’s loss of wonder through a 
meditation on Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, I will begin in 
referencing back to Heidegger’s distinction between the two types of revealing: 
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challenging-forth and poiesis. Though at this point, much of our revealing lies within 
our challenging-forth, as Heidegger stated, “the saving power must be of a higher 
essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it…” (QCT, 33). 
Kindred, yet of a much higher essence, to our challenging-forth lies the second kind of 
revealing - poiesis. I argue that it is poiesis, or what Heidegger calls “bringing-forth” (in 
contrast to our challenging-forth), that is the type of revealing - the type of relation to 
the world - that we must become more in touch with. It is this sort of revealing - this 
bringing-forth - that lends itself to be the antithesis of the mentality that inspires all 
aspects and relations and activities of our being as we now know it... it is here that, I 
argue, we can renew our sense of wonder.  
 In Heidegger’s own words, “It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-
forth in its full scope...not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical 
bringing into appearance and concrete imagery...physis also, the arising of something 
from out of itself…” (10). Here, Heidegger makes clear the different varieties of poiesis. 
Though it surely can be revealing in the sense of some concrete activity (where we 
manipulate or create a given thing), it also, perhaps most importantly for our sense of 
wonder, is the appreciation and letting be of what is, in and of itself. This sort of awe-
inspiring revealing can be seen in the blossoming of a flower, the sound of thunder 
	 40	
amidst lightning, the gradual freezing of a pond, a slow, pink sunrise, or the 
transformation from tadpole to frog. It is humanity’s recognition of the infinite ways in 
which the world, untouched by us, is eternally revealing itself. It’s just a matter of our 
letting this be, recognizing it, and perhaps being willing to lose ourselves within it for 
just a moment.  
“To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour” 
 
-William Blake, Auguries of Innocence 
 
It is a revealing, a thinking, feeling, producing, connecting, creating that does 
not come into being for practical benefit, or consumption, or profit. It is the Rhine river 
that exists not for power, but instead, a place of meditation or adventure, or as a site of 
solitary awe, or refreshment on a hot summer’s day. It is a detachment from rationality, 
an immersement in a painting or a piano sonata, in the connecting of freckles on a 
lover’s back, one’s reflection in a mirror, the sight of certain shapes within the clouds. It 
is our tapping into what reveals itself right in front of us, it is our learning how to partake 
in this sort of revealing of ourselves and the world. This, I insist, is wonder.  
 
“Wonder is the beginning of wisdom.” 
― Socrates 
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~ Chapter 2 ~ 
Poiesis and the Aesthetic Approach to the Wonders of Everyday Life 
 
 
“Wonder is no more dissolved by reason than freedom by law or enjoyment by discipline. We must look 
for the causes underlying the loss of a sense of wonder and delight, not in the activity of reasoning, but 
rather in the attitude in which the activity is carried out.”  
- Sam Keen, Apology for Wonder, 57 
 
I begin the forthcoming chapter with yet again, some disclosure of my inability 
to provide an absolute account of wonder - I dare not even let myself believe that such a 
thing is possible. Instead, I hope to only shed light on what I suppose is a certain kind or 
sense of wonder, one that seems to have been superseded by what we mistakenly 
suppose is a more beneficial way of looking at, thinking about, and using ourselves and 
the world around us. Beginning where my last chapter left of, it seems that we 
increasingly have begun to perceive our world and ourselves through the challenging-
forth that comes along with our technological thinking. With this, we have come to 
neglect bringing-forth, Heidegger’s alternative type of revealing, one that has close ties 
to poiesis. This practice of poiesis is painted as a picture of the recognition of, the 
appreciation for, and the letting be of what is. A fundamental aspect of such a practice 
lies in our ability to look beyond our own doing and benefit, and instead, open ourselves 
up to a world that holds wonders far beyond our very own selves. It is a young child’s 
gaze into the infinitely starry sky, the presence of warm, strong sunshine after a long 
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and cold winter, or perhaps even the sight of a loose plastic bag’s dance in the street on 
a windy day. I hope to make clear how moments of wonder like these - moments in 
which we seem to carry out an internal, experimental poiesis of sorts - can be better 
understood and facilitated through the cultivation of an aesthetic, distanced and 
disinterested receptivity to the world around us.  
 
Part I: Poiesis as the Revival of an Aesthetic, Appreciative Wonder 
Although Heidegger’s notion of poiesis is a strong foundation for my 
understanding of this certain sense of wonder to stand upon, I believe that a more 
evolved, contemporary theory of poiesis is necessary before we can truly understand the 
inner-workings of the deep ties between wonder and aesthetic appreciation. To develop 
what exactly I mean by poiesis in such a way, I will use Derek Whitehead’s Poiesis and 
Art-Making: A Way of Letting-Be as a reference point. To start again with Heidegger, his 
understanding of poiesis that is presented in The Question Concerning Technology derives 
from the ancient Greek take on it as the ability to “bring something from concealment 
into the full light…[it] has nothing to do with the exercise of a will and everything to do 
with ‘the production of aletheia’, with ‘unveiling’, and with the opening of a world for 
humankind’s being and action” (Whitehead, 3). This move away from our immediate 
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tendency to carry out our will and, on the contrary, the move towards an initial 
recognition of the world as it truly is stands to be a clear reflection of Heidegger’s call 
for the importance of our “bringing-forth” rather than “challenging-forth”. But before 
moving any further, I feel it is important to distinguish between two different meanings 
of poiesis that could potentially be mistakenly unified within Heidegger’s one proposed 
notion of it. In one sense, poiesis can stand to be a creative act of some kind that 
eventually ends in the willful (and artistic) production of a given thing: poetry, pottery, 
painting, sculpture, music, etc. But on the other hand, poiesis can be understood as a 
more internal practice or attitude that ultimately inspires in one a unique perception 
and understanding of the world. It is this conception of poiesis, as a sort of psychological 
unveiling of the self to the world (in contrast to an unveiling of the world to the self) as it 
truly is that is central to my exploration of wonder.  
Though Whitehead’s call for a revitalization of the “poietic act” rests upon more 
concrete and literal artistic practice, I instead want to focus on these psychological 
roots of poiesis - ones that lead to an aesthetic perspective on the world. As made clear in 
my past chapter on technological thinking, we have become increasingly comfortable 
(too comfortable) with our role as producers - for in such a position, we feel we have the 
most control over the world around us. This internal practice of poiesis that I speak of 
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achieves its significance in its ability to (even temporarily) alter our position into that of 
receivers. This is only possible through our “working with the raw materials of the 
imagination (ideas, concepts, schemata)...[as a] means of renegotiating our sense of 
‘place’ with a renewed and peaceful place of poietic and non-exploitative encounter” 
(Whitehead, 2). We must look inside ourselves and honestly take note of what is there to 
be able to step back from our all-knowing, all-powerful, self-appointed role in this 
world - and to eventually, instead, open ourselves up to an aesthetic understanding of 
and appreciation for the world as it was before us and is beyond us. As noted by 
Whitehead, mention of Alphonso Lingis’ “schematized intentionality” (Poiesis and Art-
Making, 4) in which one’s experience of the world is driven by meaning found within 
everyday sense-impressions has great relevance here. This sort of intended perception 
allows even the most quotidian of things we perceive and experience to be meaningful 
to us in some way that they otherwise might not have been. I argue that it is exactly this 
sort of poietic approach to the world that inspires our everyday, living reality to become 
aesthetically charged. It is exactly this “inner creative seeing that regathers the things of 
the world” (Whitehead, 6) that inspires a unique relation between self and world; we 
begin to learn how to not only see and experience the world as meaningfully separate 
from us, but also, increasingly wondrous because of it.  
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Part II: Poietic Practice, Aura, and the Sentimentality of Everyday Life 
I now want to delve deeper into what exactly I mean by the day-to-day 
sentimentality that this inner, experimental poiesis draws out of us. With this, we will 
move into Karsten Harries’ Transcending Aesthetics, a piece that offers significant 
musings on what it might mean to extend the realm of aesthetics as we know it into 
one’s everyday existence. I argue that such an extension relies on this experimental 
poiesis and its ability to inspire in us a shift in the self-world relation. For us to find 
ways to not only reinvigorate our sense of wonder, but to also allow and relish in its 
gaze being directed at the most ordinary of everyday objects and events, we must 
explore the necessary relationship that poiesis and everyday aesthetics share with one 
another.  
 A glowing pink and orange sunset, an awe-inspiring desert landscape that seems 
to go on forever, the tremendous size and sway of a willow tree hundreds of years old, or 
perhaps the thick, excited anticipation that exists in the air of a room in which a mother 
gives birth to a baby. There is a familiar and fleeting quality to such experiences, one 
that Harries’ most definitely would call “auratic”. She begins with an account of this 
concept of aura as “some elusive magical other” (Harries, 210) - an attribute that 
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experiences of certain kinds possess. Very similar to the meaningingful perceptual 
experience that comes about due to schematized intentionality, Harries proposes that in 
the case of aura, “the material object seen is experienced as a figure of utopia. That 
figural significance gives the perceived its special resonance and depth” (210).  This 
material object or experience, whether it is that astounding sunset or the sway of a 
mighty tree, seems to innately - effortlessly - for one reason or another, provide the 
viewer with the feeling that it is beautiful, notable, meaningful in some way. Though 
some may argue that aura’s bond with physical phenomenons imply the fact that it has a 
material basis - that is, only truly incredible physical circumstances have an auratic 
quality to them - I argue just the opposite. Similar to Harries, I believe that the 
potentiality of aura exists within the psyche of the perceiver; it is a result of the way in 
which we perceive and reflect upon the world, and therefore, is inherently 
psychological. To me, experience of an aura seems to be the difference between a person 
who stumbles upon a field of flowers and momentarily has their breath taken away, and 
that of a person who walks right past that very same field, their eyes glazing over it as if 
it has nothing at all to offer. It is the difference between the person who becomes 
enchanted by the small blue moth fluttering around them for a few minutes, and the 
person who shoos it away, or perhaps, doesn’t even notice the tiny visitor at all. Aura is 
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easy to recognize and experience when “looking at some sacred object...we are drawn to 
something nameless and far removed from the cares and concerns that bind us to the 
here and now” (Harries, 211), but what might it mean to attempt to consciously make 
these rare, fleeting, touching, wondrous moments move beyond the sacred and the 
obviously remarkable? How might we come to recognize the auratic quality that even 
the most ordinary of objects and experiences certainly do hold? 
 
“To perceive the aura of an object we look at is to invest it with the ability to look at us in return. This 
endowment is a wellspring of poetry. Wherever a human being, an animal, or an inanimate object lifts up 
its eyes, it draws him into the distance. The gaze of nature thus awakened dreams and pulls the poet after 
its dreams.”  
 -Walter Benjamin, On Some Motifs in Baudelaire 
 
 We now arrive back to the (potential) sentimentality of everyday life and the role 
that poiesis plays in our ability to both recognize and appreciate this auratic quality - the 
objectively wondrous and meaningful nature of the world around us - that I argue is 
only able to be perceived through an internal shift in how we take to the world. As 
previously made clear, this recognition and appreciation are effortless in the experience 
of sacred objects, beautiful landscapes, and starry skies. But what I find to be of utmost 
importance is the ability to look beyond the obviously and effortlessly wondrous 
escapades of existence, and instead, focus on why we should and how we can become 
more in touch with this sense of wonder in our daily lives. Harries offers an example 
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from Walter Benjamin’s On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, in which “the acquisition of a 
book, for example, is described in a way that suggests a marriage. The aura some book 
or work of art possesses for the true collector is not unlike the aura that any person 
possesses whom we encounter and cherish as such. He invests what he collects with his 
own humanity...that helps to explain its aura and his bliss” (217). This sweet 
sentimentality - that is, our potential to recognize the independence and individual 
reality of something outside of ourselves - as if, in marriage to it, we recognize its 
freedom to exist meaningfully outside of us. Here we come to see that whether it is a 
book, a person, a work of art, or a landscape (truly, anything at all), regard for the auratic 
qualities of the world around us relies on one’s ability to ascribe these things meaning 
outside of themselves. Though, my intention has been to make clear how difficult it is to 
do so when are are (as often as we are) unable to see beyond ourselves. So then how is it 
that we can charge our everyday lives with an aesthetic appreciation of things that are 
beyond the self? Fortunately, “what matters about art, in this view, belongs to spirit 
rather than matter…[it] belongs to the human spirit” (Harries, 215). We must not only 
make the distinction between self and world - “spirit and matter” - but also, embrace 
the fact that perhaps what it is that we see and experience is not at the core of our 
experience (of wonder), but instead, our experience of the world (and again, of wonder) 
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relies solely upon the sort of relation - one that relies on the human spirit - that we have 
to the world. I’d say with certainty that what we take from an experience relies wholly 
on what we bring to it. And ultimately, if an experience is colored by only the self - our 
opinions, desires, fears, etc. - we then succumb to closing ourselves off to anything 
within that very experience that exists beyond ourselves. With this, I will provide an 
account of how exactly it is possible to make sure that one is not in fact just bringing 
and taking themselves from a given experience - how exactly we can come to recognize 
how, in our everyday lives, the world is already colored by meaning, with aura, and 
wonder - all beyond the self, and that much more worth recognizing.  
 
“Wonder is an emotion which responds to the pull of the object, and one might say that in it the subject is 
maximally aware of the value of the object and only minimally aware, if at all, of its relationship to her 
own plans.”  
 -Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, 54 
 
Part III: The Aesthetic Attitudes of Psychical Distance and Disinterestedness 
 While I am sure at this point my call for an aesthetic, auratic, poietic appreciation 
of the world is clear, it seems time to inquire into how exactly one can foster such a 
sense of wonder in themselves - how exactly one can step away from the self within a 
given experience. At first thought it may seem nearly impossible in practice, or perhaps 
even an absurd idea to put forward. But seeing as the crux of my argument has been that 
wonder does not necessarily rely on the experience of something unusually spectacular, 
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and instead, rests upon the attitude we have toward the world around us, I argue that an 
aesthetic approach to the world - a distanced and disinterested approach - illuminates 
exactly how such a separation from the self, and in turn, a discovery of the small 
wonders of everyday life is possible. Furthermore, I hope to argue how disinterestedness 
as an aesthetic theory and approach to the world reflects the way in which this internal 
practiced poiesis truly works, as it calls for an encountering, experiencing, and 
understanding of the world that is for its own sake, on its own terms (leaving all 
personal motives and preconceived notions aside). This is surely a lot to unpack, 
therefore, I will begin with a brief history and background of Jerome Stolnitz’s On the 
Origins of “Aesthetic Disinterestedness”.  
 The concept of disinterestedness was introduced by Lord Shaftesbury in the 
eighteenth century. At first independent of aesthetics, Shaftesbury’s initial notion of it 
was very much rooted in the resistance of egoism and instrumentalism (though not 
necessarily aesthetic, such a basis for disinterestedness has obvious ties to my argument 
as a whole). In the beginning, disinterestedness had “only the negative or private 
meaning, ‘not motivated by self-concern’” (Stolnitz, 132). But as time went on, this 
ethical theory soon evolved into a sort of equally aesthetic theory. Soon enough, 
disinterestedness became known “as the ‘love’ of respective objects ‘for their own 
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sake’...the term no longer [had] to do with choice and action but with a mode of 
attention and concern” (Stolnitz, 133). Seeing as it is exactly the self’s attention and 
concern that make up the way in which one experiences and understands the world, the 
heart of disinterestedness is based upon our ability to direct our attention and concern 
beyond the self and wholly onto the experience at hand. To help us better understand 
the workings of this abstract aesthetic concept, I will briefly delve into Edward 
Bullough’s ‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic Principle, in which his 
concept of psychical distance proves to have deep ties to the disinterested approach, and 
therefore, will allow for a better understanding of what exactly it means to place one’s 
self outside of a given experience.  
 We’ll begin with our usual, (self-)“interested” approach to the world. Bullough 
asks us to…  
“Imagine a fog at sea; for most people it is an experience of acute unpleasantness. Apart from the physical 
annoyance and remoter forms of discomfort such as delays, it is apt to produce feelings of peculiar 
anxiety, fears of invisible dangers, strains of watching and listening for distant and unlocalised signals. 
The listless movements of the ship and her warning calls soon tell upon the nerves of the passengers; and 
that special, expectant, tacit anxiety and nervousness, always associated with this experience, make a fog 
the dreaded terror of the sea (all the more terrifying because of its very silence and gentleness) for the 
expert seafarer no less than the ignorant landsman” (Bullough, Aphorism 3).  
 
Such a description makes evident how much more aware we are of ourselves (as in, our 
subjective reaction to whatever we are in contact with) than we are of the actual 
experience at hand (in this case, the fog). It seems that in this particular case, our own 
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fears of the fog, what it may or may not lead to, our desire to escape it, etc. color our 
perception and understanding of the experience, arguably leading one to have not really 
experienced the fog at all - they merely experienced themselves. With this, Bullough calls 
for the objective appreciation of the world around us through his concept of psychical 
distance. Psychical distance (as well as disinterestedness) cultivates a detachment from 
the self in one’s perception and experience at a given time, leading to a focus on the 
objective features of the phenomenon - features entirely independent of us. “Like a 
momentary switching on of some new current, or the passing ray of a brighter light, 
illuminating the outlook upon perhaps the most ordinary and familiar objects - an 
impression which we experience in instants of direct extremity, when our practical 
interest snaps like a wire from sheer over-tension, and we watch the consummation of 
some impending catastrophe with the marvelling unconcern of a mere spectator” 
(Bullough, Aphorism 4). This inevitably fleeting yet deeply remarkable recognition of 
the world stands to be a brief (though much needed) escape from the self, and a move 
toward complete immersion into the experience at hand. It allow for a rare appreciation 
and delight in a range of experiences, objects, and relationships - this distance, this 
disinterestedness - inspires in us the uncovering of realities that have always existed, but 
are far too often overlooked. It is the recognition of the eerie beauty of the fog, “the 
	 54	
curious creamy smoothness of the water...the strange solitude and remoteness from the 
world…” (Bullough, Aphorism 4), rather than the self-oriented perspective we so often 
take. 
 To truly understand what is meant by this distance (and eventually, 
disinterestedness), one must question what exactly this distance is between. According 
to Bullough, this “distance is produced...by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of 
gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our 
personal needs and ends, in short, by looking at it ‘objectively’” (Bullough, Aphorism 6). 
Though it may seem that to achieve real distance, one must (only temporarily) part with 
their own subjectivity, I fear that may be near impossible. Instead, we must read 
Bullough’s concept as distance between the self and its use of experiences/objects as the 
vehicles in which it reflects its affections and subjectivity onto. Instead of our turning a 
thick fog into a mere reflection of our own uneasiness, psychical distance inspires a step 
back from oneself, and allows for a newfound ability to see and experience what is in 
front of oneself for what it truly is. With this, we can now move into how this aesthetic 
consciousness of the world can inspire our everyday experience.   
“We are not ordinarily aware of those aspects of things which do not touch us immediately and 
practically, nor are we generally conscious of impressions apart from our own self which is impressed. 
The sudden view of things from their reverse - usually unnoticed - side, comes upon us as a revelation” 
(Bullough, Aphorism 8).  
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This revelatory, “reversed” recognition of the elements and experiences that make up 
our everyday lives is exactly what I am hoping to get at. Through our treatment of 
objects and experiences as ends, in and of themselves, - with no practical or immediate 
ties to our own subjectivities - to be within an experience only for the sake of being 
there and experiencing it, (poiesis!) I argue that one moves closer to this certain sense of 
wonder that I feel is all too often and far too easily neglected.  
Having provided an account of Bullough’s psychical distance, I now hope that the 
role that disinterestedness plays in the facilitation of our sense of wonder will become 
increasingly clear. We should begin by delving into the (perhaps quite obvious) 
paradoxical nature of disinterestedness. Compared to our usual, subjective self-centered 
attitude toward the world, disinterestedness (as an “object/experience-centered attitude) 
relies upon an unusual amount of “vigilance and control, [and] attention to the object 
which scrupulously shuts out whatever might diminish or subvert it” (Stolnitz, 138). 
Despite this strong sense of self-realization and self-mastery that disinterestedness 
relies on, “the total experience is [actually] one of ease, fluidity, and delight” (Stolnitz, 
138). To redirect our strong instinct to control toward ourselves - shifting it inward 
instead of outward - learning to master our tendency to reflect onto the world our own 
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desires, fears, notions, and upbringings...and in turn, allowing for the world as it is to 
pour into us...it seems that both the way we see the world (and ourselves) and act within 
it could be forever changed. “To perceive disinterestedly is to make oneself a pure, 
unflawed, mirror, prepared to receive without distortion all the impressions, which the 
objects that are before us can produce” (Stolnitz, 138). It is exactly this opening up of the 
self that characterizes the internal practice of poiesis; this (not only) letting be of what is, 
but the recognition and appreciation of it. Think of the almost effortless willingness one 
has to step beyond and away from themselves during especially spectacular moments - 
witnessing marriage between two lovers, the glimpse of dolphins swimming out in the 
blue salty sea, or perhaps the sights and sounds of a firework finale overhead on the 
fourth of July. The basis of my writing and questioning stems from these so very special 
and all too rare moments. The distance between the world and the self that they inspire 
makes us feel good. So what if we could practice such distance - this poietic disinterested 
wondrous relation to the world - throughout our everyday lives? Could we find it in us 
to learn to love the slow movement and tick of a clock, the small silvery dust particles 
floating through the air that can be noticed when the light is just right, the vast field of 
flowers that one might otherwise walk right past, or maybe, just one flower, one fierce 
enough to peak its way through the still-cold soil in mid-March.  
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 Before I conclude, I hope to remedy any concerns regarding how impersonal this 
disinterested aesthetic attitude may seem. Though I surely have attested to the good 
that can come of temporarily parting with the wants, needs, aversions, opinions, and 
ideas that we keep so near and dear to us, it must be made clear that disinterestedness 
as I argue for it does not imply a complete separation from the self. With this, comes the 
necessary role of one’s imagination. In Stolnitz’s writing on disinterestedness, he recalls 
Joseph Addison’s musings on the role of the imagination within the aesthetic 
experience. The “exercise of [the] imagination is innocent...the imagination finds 
satisfaction in dwelling upon the ideas of color, figure, etc. One’s interest is in 
perceiving, and in that alone” (Stolnitz, 141). I too insist that the imagination lies far 
before and beyond the affections that we reflect upon the world. It is unique in its 
ability to both recognize and create the strange, the beautiful, the uncomfortable, the 
possibilities, the far too often overlooked - the wonder. With this, I argue that it is the 
imagination that stands as the foundation of our internal poiesis - of the disinterested 
approach that we can take to the world. It is the seed in which our ability to look, feel, 
and appreciate beyond ourselves and our common concerns begins to grow. In the 
writing to come I will reveal how the imagination is not only the inception of this 
wonder, but how it is also nourished by this very wonder that comes of it. In becoming 
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more comfortable with stepping outside of ourselves - in consciously learning how to 
thwart ourselves from using the world as a mirror of our own affections - I believe we 
allow ourselves the chance, every single day, to actually become better people; people 
with more open minds and hearts, with more acceptance and forgiveness, people with 
ever-growing moral imaginations.  
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~ Chapter 3 ~ 
Wonder and the Moral Imagination 
 
 
“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily 
we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” 
-Kant 
 
 I want to begin this final chapter by looking back to the very beginning of this all 
- that is, back to the Heideggerian “technological thinking” that we have come to know 
so well. I have argued that in the contemporary world, technological thinking has come 
to dominate our conscious lives; in many ways, it acts as the root of much of what we 
think and do, how we carry ourselves and plan out our day to day. Despite however close 
we may feel to the world in the midst of our illusory power over it, I have argued that 
such a relation to the world, roused by technological thinking, leads to a great gap 
between the self and experience - a sense of alienation from ourselves and the world 
around us. Similar to the paradoxical nature of technological thinking (in which it seems 
that we become closer to the world, though it really is just the opposite), the distanced 
and disinterested aesthetic approach to the world (which I have portrayed as a sort of 
practiced, inner poiesis), at first glance, may also seem somewhat contradictory. Such a 
relation to the world seems to cause immediate distance between oneself and the 
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experiences of everyday life - but with my last chapter in mind, we must recall that this 
is not entirely true. 
 We now know that this psychical distance - this disinterested approach to the 
world - is not actually a distance between the subject and the experience, but instead, a 
distancing between the subject and the subject’s affections (desires, needs, fears, etc.) 
toward the experience at hand (that are more often than not reflected onto the subject’s 
perception and understanding of the experience). I have argued that it this momentary 
detachment from the self that actually allows for a pure recognition of the world as it is 
beyond us, and ultimately, an appreciation, and closeness between oneself and the world 
that is otherwise quite difficult to attain. It seems to me that in stepping away from our 
innermost selves, we lend ourselves to be opened up to the world around us - we allow 
the world to reveal itself to us as it truly is, in ways that we often cannot recognize. I 
argue that this unbiased and complete embracement of a world that extends, exists, and 
flourishes far beyond ourselves inspires in us an immense growth of something called 
the moral imagination. In this chapter, I use Michael McGhee’s Moral Sentiments, Social 
Exclusion, Aesthetic Education as the foundation for my account of the moral imagination 
as a universal moral sentimentality that I argue is of utmost importance to catalyze in 
contemporary society. What I now hope to make clear is the ways in which a more 
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objective and aesthetic experience and appreciation of the world (a sure move away from 
technological thinking) can actually, quite simply, make us better people.  
 
“This is what Plato had already anticipated, when he indicated that the duty of those who escape from his 
famous cave, dazzled by the sun of the Idea, was to return to the shadows….Only today can we fully assess 
what this return means: it is that of Galilean physics back toward technical machinery, or of atomic 
theory back towards bombs and nuclear power plants. The return of disinterested-interest towards brute 
interest, the forcing of knowledges by a few truths. At the end of which the human animals has become 
the absolute master of his environment - which is, after all, nothing but a fairly mediocre planet.”  
- Alan Badiou, Ethics, 59 
 
Part I: The Imagination and the Moral 
 
 I will begin with an account of what I believe the moral imagination is, and 
within this account, portray the roles that aesthetics, morality, and of course, the 
imagination, play within it. We must first come to understand the imaginative 
underpinnings of both morality and aesthetics - for the heart of imagination is its ability 
to foster in us alternative and expanded understandings of reality as we usually know it. 
Quite simply, the imagination inspires in us - from the inside, out - different ways of 
seeing. In Amy Mullin’s Moral Defects, Aesthetic Defects, and the Imagination, she portrays 
the imagination as a “creative, reflective activity...a process is imaginative insofar as it 
involves ordering or structuring representations in a new manner” (249). She makes 
clear how the imagination can reach and alter mental images and representations of 
many kinds, including those regarding emotions, ideas, and judgements. I argue that it 
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is exactly this matter of creative, alternative seeing that is essential to both the moral and 
the aesthetic.  
What is this imaginative seeing truly made up of though? To that, I answer, a 
balanced blend of emotion, reason, and the senses. A fundamental conflict within not 
only morality, but also much of what we experience in life in general, seems to be rooted 
in the clash of these three components of our conscious lives. Our sensuous experience 
of the world relays one thing to us, while emotion and reason then quite often diverge in 
what they make of it. For morality, this has major consequences. I often find myself 
questioning whether I should base my decisions off of what I think, or what I feel...for 
they generally would lead me down very different paths. In McGhee’s text, he begins by 
recalling Hume’s conception of morality that is something “more properly felt than 
judged of” (85); here we see the ever-present conflict of consciousness, and the pressure 
to trust and choose one (either judgement or emotion) over the other that it incites 
within us. With this, McGhee calls for a recognition and mending of the unnecessary 
and often problematic divide between reason and emotion, thinking and feeling. “I want 
to consider a view of morality as involving the ‘moral sentiments’, in a way that restores 
the unity of judgment and feeling” (McGhee, 85) - that is, a reconception of morality 
that embraces reason and emotion for the very different potentials that they allow for 
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within us. I argue that the imagination, the moral imagination specifically, is 
fundamental to this unification of feeling and thinking - and ultimately, this unification 
allows for the consistency, the universality, in our moral sentiments that makes the 
moral imagination as important as it.  
 It seems that we have stumbled upon yet another paradox; the nearly 
impossible task of pulling apart the ways in which we can simultaneously allow for 
judgment and emotion to inform us. (Someone once told me that things that seem to be 
opposite of another another are actually not truly opposing at all - their seemingly 
antithetical positions often come of a deep, complicated closeness. I wonder if the 
friction between what we think versus what we feel can be explained by this. I feel sure 
that the intense difficulties I have had in writing this thesis are rooted in this very 
problem: All of my thoughts, feelings, and ideas either feel far too connected - making it 
impossible to pull them apart and truly understand them independently of one another - 
or, just the opposite...they begin to seem distant and detached from one another, which 
leaves me questioning what ties (if anything) all of this together at all.) If I have learned 
one thing though, it is that one must not become paralyzed by neither the connections 
nor the disparities. With that, I will continue on.   
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I understand the moral imagination to be a creative and wide-reaching moral 
sentimentality - a (quite literally) imaginative point that reason allows us to arrive at, 
and subsequently, then gives itself up to emotional understanding. In Steven Fesmire’s 
Imagination in Pragmatist Ethics, he cites Patricia Werhane’s conception of the moral 
imagination as “the ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate 
possibilities not merely determined by that circumstance, or limited by its operative 
mental models, or merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns…[it] 
broadens, evaluates, and even changes one’s moral point of view” (63). It is this breaking 
out of one’s instinctive, self-centered, often logical norm that is of utmost importance to 
the facilitation of the moral imagination. This temporary escape from ourselves seems 
to rely heavily on reason (in that, we must logically recognize the necessity of stepping 
outside of ourselves in a given situation). To realize particular realities, possibilities, and 
comprehensions that are so often otherwise left uncovered, we must relearn the 
balanced dance between emotion, reason, and our sensuous experience of the world.  
“We routinely encourage young children to use their imaginations in order to develop 
empathy, and we chastise older children for failing to imagine how the victims of their 
thoughtlessness feel” (Mullin, 250), yet it seems that at some point in our growing older, 
we too fail to remember in our everyday lives what it looks like to feel, see, and 
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understand beyond the self. Perhaps the very wonder that I feel has been lost to 
technological thinking - a sense in which we can see beyond the obvious, beyond the 
calculable and controllable, beyond ourselves - lies at the end of this dance between the 
different elements of our conscious lives. But where, and how, does this dance begin? I’d 
say, in the midst of poiesis - within psychical distance and the disinterested aesthetic 
approach.  
Part II: The Moral, the Aesthetic, and the Everyday 
 In my reading of Michael McGhee’s writing about morality and aesthetics, it 
seems that our initial intentions are quite similar; that is, our seeking out of the sources 
of morality within our everyday lives - the smallest of moments and interactions that 
reflect who we are, morally, as people (94). I believe that a justified account of the moral 
imagination (and morality in general) must necessarily include consideration of our day-
to-day lives, as it is within the smallest, most commonplace and often overlooked 
actions, reactions, and relationships, that we move closer to (or further away from) an 
expansion in our moral imaginations (which ultimately informs our sense of morality as 
a whole). This examination of everyday experience of course relies upon first, our 
sensuous experience, and second, what we make of it. With this, it seems right to 
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propose that perhaps this dance between reason and emotion is set on the very stage of 
sense perception.  
 In James Mesa’s The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Aesthetic in Moral 
Imagination he sheds light upon these fundamental ties between judgment, feeling, and 
sensuous experience. In recollection of Russell Kirk’s description of the moral 
imagination as “that power of ethical perception which strides beyond the barriers of 
private experience and momentary events” (240), he alludes to the way in which our 
morality (or for my argument, the moral imagination) is quite literally imbued by our 
ethical perceptions. I hope to take this a step further in my argument that it is our 
aesthetic perceptions that actually inspire these ethical perceptions. I claim that there is 
no real gap between how we perceive “normally” and how we perceive “ethically” - for 
the two are inherently wrapped up within one another within our everyday lives. 
Notions of what is right and wrong, fair or unjust, color our experience on a daily basis; 
the moral imagination is constantly open to and inspired by what we see (and fail to see) 
in everyday life. 
 
 “There is a connection between virtue and vision. One has to see correctly before one can act correctly.”  
- William Kilpatrick, Why Johnny Can’t Tell Right From Wrong, 133 
 
	 68	
This proposed relation between perception and emotion leads us back to the role that 
reason has within this dance. For one to see “correctly”, or as I have argued, aesthetically, 
one must consciously, through some sort of split-second reasoning, direct their 
attention, just momentarily, away from their affections, beyond themselves, and entirely 
onto the experience at hand. It is here that we find ourselves opened up to the world, 
disposed to see and feel it as it really is. Contrary to this picture I have painted, Mesa 
offers a shining example that represents a very different scenario - one that I believe is 
at the very heart of the problem I am grappling with. He puts forth how in our 
perception of the world, “our aesthetic delight is much greater when the effects of 
human intelligence are present. The bay of Rio de Janerio is indeed beautiful he admits, 
but he is moved more profoundly by ‘the port of Marseilles, as it opens its man-managed 
secretive basins one after another, in a forest of masts, cranes, lights, and memories!’...in 
perceiving beauty, intelligence recognizes its own indispensable role in the aesthetic 
experience, and in some fashion comes face to face with itself” (Mesa, 243). This 
example put forth by Mesa relays a situational experience that is undoubtedly quite 
familiar to us all - that is, the ways in which the world seems that much more amazing 
because of our accomplishments and roles within it. More often than not, the self stands 
to be the conscious center of not only aesthetic perception and understanding, but of 
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course, moral perception and understanding as well - for morality cannot be thought of 
where our attention is not placed. In recognition of our narcissistic tendency to view, 
use, understand, and appreciate the world as a mere reflection of human achievement 
and benefit, the severe moral consequences that come along with this (that is, a reducing 
of our moral imaginations - and yes, wonder!) hopefully become clear. A self-oriented 
perception of the world leads to a self-oriented morality, which I’d say, is not much of a 
morality at all.  
 
“There is always one question in the ethic of truths: how will I, as some-one, continue to exceed my own being? 
How will I link the things I know, in a consistent fashion, via the effects of being seized by the not-known?”  
- Badiou,  Ethics, 50 
 
Part III: Disinterestedness and the Moral Imagination 
 Now that the connections between the imagination, morality, and aesthetic 
perception have been made clear, I will now delve into how exactly the disinterested 
attitude - a selfless, objective perception, understanding, and appreciation of the world - 
inspires in us a universalization of our moral sentiments. To do so, we will begin on the 
grounds of McGhee’s stance on the role of feelings within morality. “Differences within 
the emotions, even between instances of the same general kind, are a matter of our 
descriptions of the world as it affects us. One reason that sympathy, for example, can 
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hardly be a ground of morality...is that our moral assessments of different examples of 
sympathy depends upon our descriptions of their objects” (McGhee, 85). Here, McGhee 
points to the strong bond between sympathy and the self; often times, what we feel 
sympathetic towards is very much tied to our subjective experience of the world - that 
is, our personal affections that we reflect onto the experience at hand. This mercurial 
nature of emotion lends itself to what McGhee calls the “bias to the near” (86) - a bias 
that seems to be responsible for moral inconsistency. This is characterized by a 
“fickleness of attention to specific realities that the sentiment itself has identified” 
(McGhee, 86) as both worthy of attention and sympathy. Both our perception and moral 
compass are naturally triggered by things, people, and experiences in the world around 
us that we feel relate to our own self-experience...but although our “feeling may ebb and 
flow [in such a way, how is it that we can] latch on nevertheless to the facts about people 
and other sentient beings [outside of ourselves] that engage our moral feelings” 
(McGhee, 86)?  
 Once again, we arrive at the fact that our moral attention is very much tied to our 
own specific reality, in which it can recognize and interact with itself (think back to the 
example about our heightened enjoyment of aesthetic experiences in which we can 
recognize the role of the self). So with this, my questioning lies in our ability - despite 
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this self-specified ebb and flow of feeling - to shift our focused attention away from the 
self and out towards the objective facets of reality. We need to “correct the bias to the 
near, and, more generally, correct and train the moral sentiments, which depends upon 
a relation between judgment and feeling, in which the critical scrutiny of judgment 
alters feeling, [and] allows us to make a connection with the neglected” (McGhee, 86). It 
is here that McGhee provides a perhaps unintended, but nonetheless very helpful, 
account of how the disinterested, aesthetic approach to the world embodies this balance 
between our thinking and feeling. Judgment, or reason, allows us to step away from our 
affections momentarily - it transforms both our perception and the feelings we 
experience along with it. It is this necessary, conscious, reasoned shift away from the self 
and toward the complete immersion of oneself into a given experience that leads to 
wonder.  
 With what we know about disinterestedness (and psychical distance) in mind, I 
hope that its ability to open one’s eyes up to the small yet significant elements and 
experiences of day-to-day life, its power to summon in us a recognition of and reflection 
upon a world that has a rich existence that is entirely free of one’s self, and ultimately, 
the altered relationship between the self and the world that then emerges because of 
this, is evident. But in the spirit of how ultra-complicated all of this truly does feel, let 
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me further explore how this process actually works. To do so I will adopt a few terms 
put forth by McGhee in his own writing, in which he too examines morality’s move 
from the particular to the universal. Most often, we begin with attention (and sympathy) 
toward the immediate - that is, what most concerns us in relation to ourselves and the 
outside world. An example of this might be one’s failure to notice the beauty that exists 
within a morning’s heavy, rolling fog because they are so focused on getting to work on 
time, or perhaps one’s simply failing to notice the needs of a friend because of the chaos 
that has ensued in one’s own day. In our attention’s move away from the particular and 
toward the universal, McGhee posits that there must be a revelatory moment in which 
“the immediate becomes reflective” (McGhee, 90). I argue that the immediate’s capacity 
to become reflective relies on the disinterested approach. That is, the “revelation which 
broadens the descriptions under which [one’s] sentiments become engaged” (McGhee, 
90) in which we look, feel, and think far beyond ourselves. This is, quite literally, the 
disinterested attitude’s ability to detach the self from it’s affections (or more 
specifically, one’s reflection of these affections onto the experience at hand). This 
universalization of our moral sentiments - this moral moment of wonder - is what I 
argue is responsible for the moral imagination. It is these revelatory moments that we 
gain perspective on what is outside of us - despite our immediate desires, fears, 
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obligations, and interests. These moments are fleeting, and they can come of both some 
of the most spectacular occurrences and the most quotidian. Though the spectacular (a 
fiery-orange sunset, or the dance of a flock of birds above us) provides much more 
noticeable ground to stand on, I argue that it is our ability to notice these moments 
within the quotidian as well (one’s shadow walking beside them on a sunny, Spring day, 
the sparkle within a best friend’s eyes as they speak of a newfound lover, or the 
comforting aroma that spills out of an old, dusty book) that is of utmost importance. 
One’s awareness of these small wonders in our ordinary, day-to-day lives, is simply just 
a matter of how open we are to them - how willing we are, on a daily basis, to allow 
ourselves to feel taken and amazed by not only the biggest, but also, the smallest of 
marvels that are all around us.  
 Though it often feels most comfortable to write in hypotheticals, it seems 
necessary at this point for me to provide some concrete examples of what I mean by all 
of this. I will happily begin by presenting an account of the work of one of my favorite 
artists, Diana Thater. Collections of her work on exhibit are invariably known as The 
Sympathetic Imagination; these exhibits are made up of a variety of different immersive 
video installations that seem to transport the viewer into an entirely different realm of 
the natural world. While walking through her artwork, one might find themselves 
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seemingly swimming amidst dolphins 
in her Delphine, or perhaps walking 
through the colorized architecture of a 
buzzing beehive in her knots + surfaces. 
Instead of just standing in front of a 
screen, with literal, physical, distance 
separating the viewer from whatever it is that they are watching, Thater’s projections 
fill entire walls, ceilings, and floors, turning what once looked like a normal room into a 
dynamic and mesmeric reflection of a subjectivity entirely different than our own. 
Considering our tendency to 
understand the world through our 
own subjectivities (and how 
exceptionally easy it is to do this 
with art in particular), Diana 
Thater’s ability to quite literally 
create an environment that is a breeding ground for aesthetic disinterestedness has 
never failed to blow my mind. Walking among her art, one feels almost out of body - the 
lines between oneself and the external, entirely blurred. It seems that in her removal of 
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the physical distance between the viewer and the artwork, she ends up creating psychical 
distance between the viewer and themselves. One is suddenly able to infiltrate into the 
space between the self and external world, and quite literally (through her projections), 
become one with the other. Thater somehow provokes in us a desire, a need, to step 
away from one’s self - it often feels that my mind as I usually know it, full of lingering 
thoughts, worries, inclinations, etc., exists only within the shadows of myself that I pay 
no mind to while standing within a given projection. It is this revelatory, reflective 
moment that broadens the moral - or as Thater might say, the sympathetic - imagination.  
 Another example that seems in many ways to have direct ties to both aesthetic 
disinterestedness and the role it plays in the moral imagination is the psychedelic 
experience. Seeing as such an experience might not be known by my reader (along with 
my hesitance to speak from any personal experience I have had of it), I will use Aldous 
Huxley’s depiction of it in his book The Doors of Perception. It feels right to begin with 
his conception of our normal state of consciousness, one that aligns more with 
Heideggerian technological thinking (and stands to be quite the opposite of the 
disinterested attitude). He states, “the function of the brain and nervous system is to 
protect us from being overwhelmed and confused by the mass of largely useless and 
irrelevant knowledge...and leaving only that very small and special selection which is 
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likely to be practically useful. The suggestion is that the function of the brain and 
nervous system and sense organs is in the main eliminative and not productive” (Huxley, 
22). With this, Huxley alludes to our instinctive attention to what seems most relevant, 
useful, and beneficial to the self at a given moment in time; all other things that reside 
outside of this ideal are often left overlooked. His conception of the brain as a “reducing 
valve” of sorts is then put up against his notion of the potential “Mind at Large”, in 
which the self (within a psychedelic experience) is opened up to all that is usually 
overlooked.  
Many speak of the sort of ego-dissolution - the temporary loss of subjective self-
identity - that often comes along with a psychedelic experience; it is within this state 
that once again, disinterestedness - a psychical distance from ourselves - makes its way to 
the surface. For Huxley, the use of mescalin allowed for the rare experience of this ultra-
poietic “Mind at Large”. “The other world to which mescalin admitted me was not the 
world of visions….the great change was in the realm of objective fact. What had 
happened to my subjective universe was relatively unimportant” (Huxley, 16). I cannot 
overstate the importance of this distinction between “objective fact” and one’s 
“subjective universe” - with this, Huxley makes clear that it is not so much about the 
fleeting, subjective psychedelic visions that are often thought to make up a 
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trip...instead, the significant shift in consciousness resides within the prominent change 
in one’s attention to objective fact - elements of the world that hold a meaningful 
existence outside of the self. Once one is “shaken out of the ruts of ordinary perception” 
(Huxley, 73), “the man who comes back through the Door in the Wall will never be quite 
the same as the man who went out. He will be wiser but less cocksure, happier but less 
self-satisfied, humbler in acknowledging his ignorance yet better equipped to 
understand the relationship of words to things, of systematic reasoning to the 
unfathomable Mystery which it tries, forever vainly, to comprehend” (Huxley, 79). The 
psychedelic experience is undoubtedly one way to experience a sort of open-minded, 
changed perspective on the relation between the self and the world - one that seems to 
effortlessly lead one to take notice of the wonders of the world that exist all around us, 
always. Contemplation upon the clouds floating above us, the grass that we lay among, 
the sheer brilliance of tiny droplets of water, the soft touch of a friend’s hand in 
yours...these small yet ever meaningful episodic experiences of the world have a new 
light shed upon them throughout the psychedelic experience - an attentive, inner light 
that seems to stick around long after the trip has concluded, a light that I believe pours 
into the moral imagination. 
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Though there may be nothing quite like the psychedelic experience, I feel 
strongly that the reflective, revelatory attention that it inspires within us is something 
we can and should attempt to facilitate within our everyday lives. This of course depends 
upon our ability to actively resist our selfish desire for some sense of control over and 
subjective knowing of the world around us - that is, our technological thinking. As 
Nietzsche once wrote in his Slave and Master Morality, sympathy is not a major value in 
the lives of masters, and as I have argued, this lack of attention to and sympathy for facets 
of our everyday lives leaves us closed off to a certain sense of wonder, a certain 
discerning of and appreciation for the small and large realities that exist all around us - 
beyond us. So with this, it seems that we must take a step back, and as Heidegger called 
for, examine and question what it is we do and why it is we do it. “We have to learn 
when to force our will on things and when we have to remain obedient to their qualities 
and aptitudes” (McGhee, 98), and remind ourselves that there is an easily forgotten 
beauty inherent to the untouched, the “pure”, the separate from our own doing and 
being. And beyond just this, we must remember that there is value in not only 
recognizing the more easily overlooked facets of the physical world, but of course - and 
perhaps most importantly for the moral imagination - there is a necessary value in 
recognizing certain elements of human existence (ideologies, traditions, etc.)  - elements 
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that persist far beyond our own subjectivity. McGhee provides a helpful portrayal of 
what I mean by this in his anecdote about the different forms of thinking and being that 
come to dominate our conscious lives. We often struggle to think outside of this box of 
the self, “thus an academic’s failure to help the man who fell among thieves might be 
explained by a habit of analysis, a businessman’s by a habit of calculation, dominating 
their minds as they pass, so that neither can pay the attention that moves the soul” 
(McGhee, 102). We become increasingly comfortable in our particular customs of 
thought, therefore, it is of great importance to find ways in which we can relax, even 
shatter, these mental confines. Similar to McGhee, I posit that poietic practices are a 
sure way of doing this. Although “narrative, song, music, and drama are public forms of 
reflection, in which a community looks at itself and discovers at the same time the terms 
of its own reflection” (McGhee, 98), I have called for an extension of this poiesis out 
beyond the aesthetic realm as we know it - an everyday, internalized, disinterested sense 
of poiesis that can interact with all aspects of the external world, one that can allow us to 
think, feel, and act among realities that are not our own, feeding and filling our sense of 
morality along the way. 
This all brings to mind the tiny beautiful sensitivities that often times I feel 
children are most apt to pick up on - the joy of squishing wet sand between one’s 
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fingers, the excitement that comes along with the chance to take a walk outside, the 
heartbreak that ensues with the death of a pet frog, or the strange mix of astonishment, 
fear, and utter delight that is brought about by thunder and lightning. It is this sense of 
wonder, this utter enchantment by both the quotidian and the spectacular, that I believe 
feeds into a sort of selflessness and awareness of the “other” that is of extraordinary 
importance to cultivate. Children have not yet had the chance to become attached to a 
certain way of thinking and seeing, they have not yet been tainted by the illusory power 
dynamic that comes to exist between the self and the world. In Kevin Tobia’s Wonder 
and Value, he recalls John Dewey’s conception of this certain sense of wonder, and what 
exactly it means to have lost sight of it. “Dewey felt that to lose the feeling of wonder is 
to ‘lose the sense of the universality and objectivity of mind; it is to sink back contented 
into one’s own subjective possessions, and thus commit intellectual suicide” (Tobia, 21). 
Might this be what we have done? I say, yes. 
With this, I’d like to move into a final account of what might be possible for the 
moral imagination if we can find it in us to take a more disinterested, poietic, approach 
to the world in our everyday lives. At this point, hopefully it is clear that in compelling 
our imagination to reach beyond ourselves in our day-to-day sensuous experience, our 
technological thinking - this dominant, false consciousness - is relaxed in a way that 
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transforms emotion, reason, perception, and of course, morality. So then, “perhaps the 
dominant moral sentiments of the [contrary] constructive mode are benevolence, 
appreciation, and a kind of ‘sympathy’ marked by...an attitude of sympathetic joy in the 
flourishing of another” (McGhee, 97). This “flourishing of another” - the recognition of, 
appreciation of, and letting be of what is - reflects exactly the sense of poiesis that I 
depicted earlier. And although this of course begins in our perception of the world, it 
inevitably ends up inspiring a questioning and re-orienting of what we pay attention to - 
what we truly value -outside of ourselves as human beings. What we pay attention to 
(and appreciate) in our everyday lives has ever-lasting ties to what we consider (and feel 
is right, or wrong) in our moral imaginations. This all brings to mind the space that 
exists between invention and discovery - we must question what each brings to us, and 
how our technological thinking is often tied to our affinity for invention (for change, 
production, possession, etc.) and how on the contrary, poiesis is much more reflective of 
our sense of discovery (the revelatory experience that comes about in recognition of 
what is beyond us). But “the rhythms of [this] process have to be learnt and taught, and 
humans relationships themselves are discovered to be of the same kind, as friendship 
themselves are discovered to be of the same kind, as friendships form and develop 
according to processes that are not for any individual to invent, but only to discover” 
	 82	
(McGhee, 99). This parallel between the inner-workings of friendship and our discovery 
of the world beyond us sheds light upon what perhaps this sense of wonder that I am 
reaching towards really is - that is, a befriending (not a power over, control of, or 
possession) of the world we experience in our everyday lives.  
To conclude, I must make clear that the great growth in our moral imaginations 
that can potentially come of all of this is absolutely dependent on us actually and 
consistently carrying out this changed relationship to the world. As McGhee makes 
clear, we have mistakenly come to think that morality stands by itself - that morality is 
independent and separate from how we carry ourselves in our everyday lives. The moral 
imagination “depends upon experience of and participation in the relevant activities 
[what I argue to be, the disinterested approach]...In the absence of the relevant 
experience, the value discourse [morality] loses its grip because of the absence of what it 
expresses” (McGhee, 100). As I have said once before, morality is not a part of ourselves 
that can so simply be turned off and on - there are no isolated moments of morality. The 
moral imagination - what I have argued to be at the heart of morality as a whole - has 
the potential to grow, shift, and change on a daily basis. Without our internal sense of 
poiesis (disinterestedness), I argue that it slowly, but surely, begins to diminish. But with 
it - with this sense of wonder that we surely can and should find in the quotidian and 
	 83	
the spectacular alike - we nurture our moral imaginations. We allow ourselves the 
opportunity to cultivate a wider, more universalized, attention to and sympathy for the 
world as it is far beyond just ourselves. 
 
“Observe the wonders as they occur around you. Don't claim them. Feel the artistry moving through and 
be silent. Don't grieve. Anything you lose comes round in another form.” 
-Rumi 
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~ Conclusion ~ 
 Having traversed through my account of our loss of wonder, the poietic, aesthetic 
means by which we can revive it, and ultimately, the moral value of such wonder, it 
seems we have (at last!) reached the end of this journey. I began with an account of 
modern-day technological thinking - the pervasive mentality that has come to not only 
influence the ways in which we go about our everyday lives, but also, in turn, has lead to 
some loss in our sense of wonder.  In response to this deprivation, I then posit that an 
everyday, (psychically) distanced, disinterested aesthetic perception of the world - one 
that portrays the internal practice of poiesis - is a way in which we can not only enliven 
our sense of wonder, but also, ultimately allow for a more expansive and accepting 
moral imagination. My writing of this project has been equally cerebral and 
emotional...even somehow, sensory and quite physical at times. Though there is so 
much of me within this, I have benefited greatly from my willingness to - my need to - 
think and feel beyond myself and my surroundings amidst my writing of it. Perhaps we 
have here, in some strange form, a sustained experience of wonder. Let us recount.  
 It seems necessary to end where we began, and perhaps then, see what we can 
make of the ties I have formed to arrive back to this ending. My first chapter, based 
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heavily upon Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, aims to shed light 
on the modern-day mentality that I hold responsible for our lapse in wonder. Heidegger 
provides a riveting account of the deeply flawed relationship between humanity and the 
natural world - a relationship that he intends to better understand in account of the 
technological thinking that is at the heart of our state of Enframement. This 
technological thinking is characterized by a strong sense of efficiency, utility, 
calculability, and productivity...it is the way in which we have come to perceive, 
understand, and make use of the world only insofar as it can stand to benefit us. Though 
Heidegger maintains that such thinking is actually not inherently bad (it is undoubtedly 
necessary in many ways!), what does stand to be the heart of the issue is our mindless 
perpetuation of it throughout our everyday lives. Going beyond just the states of 
alienation, disenchantment, and Enframement that technological thinking is reflective 
of, I conclude that such socio-psychological conditions are illustrative of a loss in our 
sense and experience of wonder throughout our everyday lives. Though Heidegger 
called for the importance of questioning such systems of thinking - of re-interpreting 
how we act, why we act this way, who we are...I believe that my writing is indicative of 
what I argue is our need to ask such questions. Heidegger makes clear how the ways in 
which we reveal the world (our challenging-forth), are not only inherently connected to 
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the way we understand it, but also, the ways in which we use it. Our technological 
thinking is not isolated - it permeates out into unknowable, unforeseeable aspects of 
our being. With this, we must follow Heidegger in his questioning...and then begin our 
very own. In answering to my own questioning, I posit that a different type of revealing 
that Heidegger puts forth, bringing-forth or poiesis - which inspires not only the 
recognition and appreciation of, but also, the letting-be of what is, in and of itself - is 
what can reinvigorate our lost sense of wonder.  
 In my next chapter, which sustains a much happier and hopeful note, I delve 
deeper into the connection between poiesis and our sense of wonder.  I offer a 
reconceptualization of poiesis as a sort of internal practice or attitude that inspires in us 
a uniquely aesthetic perception and experience of the world around us. This perception, 
allowing us to become more receptive to the world as it is beyond our own needs, 
desires, opinions, etc. (quite the opposite of technological thinking), allows one to relish 
in the quotidian as if it were (as it is) truly remarkable. I use two aesthetic theories, 
psychical distance (by Edward Bullough) and disinterestedness (by Jerome Stolnitz) to make 
better sense of the way wonder is reinvigorated by poiesis. Both theories, as we now 
know, speak to the significance of our attention being placed upon, and subsequently, 
entirely immersed within, the objective qualities of an experience. In this encountering 
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of the world for its own sake, overlooking the affections that one usually reflects upon 
their interpretation of a given experience, one is able to recognize and appreciate what 
is independent of their own subjectivities. With this, I allude to the great possibility of 
our recognition (and appreciation) of the small, more often overlooked, wondrous 
realities of the world around us. It is this fleeting and complete immersion into the 
world as it exists outside of us that I argue exemplifies an openness to the world as it is 
beyond us - our openness to wonder. 
 Carrying on in the spirit of my second chapter, my third and final chapter seeks 
to further understand the effects of this internal, poietic, disinterested taking to the 
world - one that I argue stands to be a source of morality within our everyday lives. 
Using Michael McGhee’s conception of morality that involves the “moral sentiments” 
(in his Moral Sentiments, Social Exclusion, Aesthetic Education) - a morality that involves 
both reason and emotion - I posit that the selfless experience and appreciation of the 
objective qualities of an experience (that comes about through poiesis) leads to an 
immense growth in our moral imaginations. Marked by our ability to conceive of a 
wider range of possibilities, explanations, and perspectives (outside of our very own) 
within a morally relevant situation, the moral imagination as I argue for it relies heavily 
on the imaginative underpinnings of our aesthetic perception in everyday life. Similar to 
	 89	
a very significant facet of my first chapter, I maintain here that our everyday (aesthetic) 
relation to and experience of the world is reflective of who we are (morally) as people. 
This poietic perception of and relation to the world - the disinterested shift away from 
subjectivity - informs and inspires the expansion of our moral perceptions; it allows for 
the moral sentiment’s move from the particular (our subjective “bias to the near” as 
McGhee would put it) to the objective and universal - it as at this point that the moral 
imagination grows. 
 Prior to my account of the more broad philosophical (and personal) implications 
that my writing imparts, it seems right to first consider a few lines of thought that stand 
in some opposition to my argument as a whole. The first that I would like to consider, 
one that is most important for me to make clear that I have pondered deeply (and even 
support, in some ways), is how truly amazing the human ability to and propensity for 
relating to the world through their very own subjectivities is. The way in which we can 
(and do) go out into the world, on a daily basis, and make connections between our 
deepest desires, our fears, our own personal opinions and feelings...and the things, 
experiences, and people that make up the external world - our natural drive to see 
ourselves in all that is around us; I cannot deny how remarkable this really is. I see, and 
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appreciate, the intuitive and personal ties we come to have with the world - the affinities 
that we learn of - through keeping ourselves in mind.  
Though I have spent much of my writing arguing against this tendency, it is 
important for me to make clear that it is not because I do not recognize its value. I do 
feel that the way in which one, perhaps going through heartbreak, can suddenly hear 
themselves in every sad song that comes on, is wondrous in its own right. Or perhaps, 
looking back to Bullough’s fog, the dreadful experience that one might make of being 
stuck far out at sea in the midst of a heavy fog...it becomes all the more emotional and 
meaningful because of one’s experience of it through themselves. And perhaps that is 
exactly why we often go throughout our lives in this way; to see ourselves in the world is 
to better feel ourselves in it as well. This way in which we color our own experiences is 
amazing - but it comes so easily to us. With this in mind, I suppose I have intended to 
make the importance of doing just the opposite clear - what does not come so naturally 
to us. The sense of wonder that I have been reaching for is one that takes root far 
beyond the self and it’s own affections...it is born in and of what we are able to make of 
our experiences when we allow them to be what they are in their own right - without the 
reflection of our own selves staring right back at us.  
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 Yet another counter-argument, one that provides an evolutionary account of 
humanity’s sense of wonder, comes from Richard Dawkins (within Robert Fuller’s 
Wonder: From Emotion to Spirituality). It seems right to first begin with the ways in which 
Dawkins’ conception of wonder is far different than my own; “Dawkins, moreover, is 
specifically interested in the origins and function of what he calls humanity’s ‘appetite 
for wonder’. He accounts for wonder by noting that ‘it is as if the nervous system is 
turned at successive hierarchical levels to respond strongly to the unexpected, weakly or 
not at all to the expected’. [Wonder’s] primary function is to intensify our cognitive 
response to the world” (Fuller, 58). Though we perhaps may agree that wonder does 
allow for some change and/or intensification in our response to the external world, 
Dawkins posits that it only comes about in response to something particularly 
surprising or extraordinary. I, on the other hand, have spent the entirety of my writing 
in support of a sense of wonder that is evoked by the most common, quotidian, 
“unspectacular” facets of our everyday lives - and of course, the profound value that 
comes along with experiencing the world in such a way. Though Dawkins - keeping to 
his evolutionary perspective - most likely would not agree with my notion of wonder, 
perhaps our varying conditions of it might be more worth overlooking if he, at the very 
least, gave it the esteem that it surely deserves. “We are told [by Dawkins] that humans 
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‘have an appetite for wonder...which real science ought to be feeding (rather than being 
fed by religious superstitions)’. Thus, while Dawkins recognizes the central importance 
of humanity’s ‘appetite for wonder’ in guiding us to productive relationships with the 
world, he believes that wonder has no normative value for this unless it eventuates in 
scientific rationality” (Fuller, 58). Beyond just his narrow conception of wonder, we see 
here how Dawkins also limits the value of wonder within only the scientific realm. In 
not only stripping wonder of its potential to be experienced beyond just the surprising 
or “extraordinary”, but also stripping it of its promise to facilitate all kinds of thinking 
and feeling (beyond just scientific rationality), I fear that Dawkins just might exemplify 
the sort of technological thinking that I previously gave an account of. Outside of 
scientific knowledge - calculable, profitable, scientific “progress” - Dawkins does not 
recognize what we might make of our sense of wonder. He allows no space for the 
poietic letting-be of what already is, and instead, he calls for (an all too familiar) 
rationalization of what we come into contact with throughout the world around us.  
 To just momentarily step away from wonder, I find that perhaps one of the most 
significant points of my writing as a whole is the way in which I feel we must (especially 
now, of all times) become more aware and mindful of our relationship to the world 
around us. Whether it is the way in which one treats a friend or passes by a stranger, the 
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attention one pays to the plants in their house or the question that a young child 
asks...these interactions/relationships/experiences and the grace - the wonder! - that we 
have while carrying them out, I believe, says so much about us as people. Perhaps what 
my real point is, is that there is a deep, strong tie between how we act in our everyday 
lives (even within the most insignificant of actions) and who we are, at the core, as 
people. Despite how trivial the way in which one acts among a stranger, a plant, or a 
young child in passing may seem, I insist, wholeheartedly, that we show our truest of 
selves throughout these correspondences with elements of the world around us. The 
attention we pay to given things, how we think about these things, how we act with them 
- it is all informed by the kind of people that we are. As I have obviously made clear at 
this point, our hearts and minds are reflected in all that we do - so I suppose, at the very 
least, I am calling for some reconsideration of how it is that I - how it is that you - turn 
to the world around me - around us. What do we make of the small joys within everyday 
life...are we even noticing them? And how could we, in opening up our attentiveness 
and changing the way we understand and act among the world, become truly better, 
more moral people? Though I have tried my best to answer such questions, if I have not 
entirely succeeded in doing so, I can happily accept that at the very least I got you, as 
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my reader, to ponder these questions, and maybe even come to some answers of your 
own. 
 As Sophia Vasalou promptly states in her Wonder: A Grammar, “thinking it is one 
of the few means by which one might hope to retain it” (1). I think I can say, with 
certainty, that that is what I have done here - and hopefully, in your reading of it, such 
thinking of wonder, and in turn, the preservation of it, has been passed onto you - into 
you - in some way. I would be lying if I said that this has not all been nearly 
excruciatingly difficult to write about - in both the best and worst of ways. Wonder is an 
experience - a sense - like no other, and it has proven to be one of the most (nearly) 
inexpressible joys to attempt to put into writing. I hope you know what I have meant in 
my contention that we must recognize the separate, individual, amazingness of all 
creatures and things that make up our daily lives to ever really, truly know and appreciate 
them. I hope you know what I have meant when I allude to the gaze that one can 
sometimes take to the world, as if peering through the looking-glass of childhood. I 
hope you know what I now mean when I say that all we have is who we are, how we are, 
in our everyday lives. The wonders that you notice and delight in today might just be the 
very last that you come across - or perhaps, they will have the chance to better shape the 
way you think and go about something significant tomorrow. Though I began my 
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writing in fear, I now end it in peace. I feel more certain than ever that I have it in me - 
that you have it in you - to unendingly feel enchanted by the shadows, the songs, the 
sparkles of dust, the blooming flowers, the smell of a book, the breath of a friend, the 
loss of a lover, the clouds in the sky, the creases in your hands, the roll of a fog...here is 
to wonder, in each and every one of its forms that it may come to us within, day after 
day after day; here is to being better because of it. 
 
“... in the fullest bloom of pure being, even our sense of self is shouldered aside. We forget ourselves, lose 
ourselves. We become mere experiencers. We encounter selfless states of pure being. Such states can also 
bring us to the very lip of volcanic euphoria - or flood us with deep contentment, or make us (briefly) one 
with the universe and show us a spark, gleam, glimpse, or lightning flash of what is meant by ‘God’.” 
 -David Gelernter, Tides of Mind, 31 
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